Aquinas on Human Action and Culpability
© Scott David Foutz

In order for certain human actions to be deemed moral, thereby making the individual culpable, the demonstration must be made that such actions are distinct from acts which arise through external principles, as well as those acts arising from internal principles which are non-culpable. This brief paper will examine Aquinas' theory of human activity in general and voluntary activity specifically. Our purpose will be to determine Aquinas' placement and definition of human moral culpability as pertains to the individual's voluntary action.

Aquinas defines nature as a complex of powers which are properly coordinated to focus on one object as its end (telos). ( ST I-II, q1.a2.c) This definition is general and holds true for all substances, whether rational or non-rational living creatures, or inanimate objects. Such a definition locates the orientation toward an end within the nature itself as opposed to within a relation of the nature to something external. All natures, therefore, by definition move toward their respective ends. From this we see that the mere fact that humans move toward ends does not suffice to account for culpability since the same characteristic is shared, not only with non-rational animal, but even with inanimate objects. What then sets human activity apart from other activity?

Aquinas will make this distinction at the level of rational versus non-rational creatures. For in rational beings, Aquinas finds the capacity for ordering themselves to a end, whereas non-rational beings are ordered toward that end by another. ( ST I, q22.a2.ad4; also q103.a1.ad3; I-II.q1.a2.c) Here, "ordering oneself" toward an end is not to be confused with the previous discussion of "moving" toward an end, which we claimed all natures do equally. The difference lies in the given nature's capability (or lack thereof) to manipulate the relation of means and end. Aquinas here states that only rational beings are able to deliberate and choose among possible means to achieve the end (determined by nature). Neither inanimate objects ¹ nor non-rational objects are capable of such deliberation, and thereby lack the ability to order themselves toward the end.

Let us digress for a moment and clarify what this implies. Aquinas is not here implying that non-rational animals lack the ability to choose between various ends, for it is clear that the tiger pursues the boar rather than the stone to appease its hunger. The tiger clearly cognizes the end (the boar), and even cognizes the means (such as the pursuit). What the tiger lacks is the ability to distinguish the concept of means as means, and end as end, for such a conceptual distinction depends upon the ability to apprehend universals. And since the conceptual distinction is missing, it remains impossible for the tiger to deliberate among other possible means. Instead, the "choice" of means which the tiger employs is made based on the internal principles of its nature, which in turn are derived from God as the First Cause. Rationality allows the human being to conceptually distinguish between means and end, thereby allowing a recognition of other possible means and thus a self-ordering toward the end. The requirements, therefore, for such self-ordering are threefold: (a) the ability to cognize the end (which animals likewise do); (b) the ability to recognize end as end and means as means (through apprehension of universals); and (c) the ability to recognize the relation of means to end (through accurate recognition of each).

But the isolation of the deliberative ability in rational beings still does not account for culpability for the following reason. Just as the non-rational is destined to choose a means through its nature determined toward an end by God, so also the rational being chooses a means (though self-ordered) through its nature likewise determined toward an end by God. In essence, both must admit that their choice of means is through internal powers (natural inclination in the one, and the power of reason and will in the other) which are ultimately received by God as First Cause (Aquinas recognizes this in ST I, q15.). This brings us to a very significant point in Aquinas' theory of human volition or free will. Aquinas' definition of self-ordering (free will) refers solely to the type of causation present in voluntary action, rather than the source of that action. In other words, in answer to the question "Why, ultimately, did I choose A over B?", Aquinas will maintain that the ultimate end of the individual (and thereby a member of the species and specific nature) is determined by God ² . Here, the question is "How do I possess the capacity to choose A over B?", to which Aquinas offers the answer under discussion. Free will is a type of causality within a causal sequence derived from the First Cause, rather than being a first cause in itself. For this reason, Aquinas refers to rational beings as both self-orderers and quasi -self-orderers ( ST I-II, q1.a2.c.). The question, therefore, remains as to why human activity is deemed culpable. How does changing the type of causality account for moral culpability?

The answer lies in God's relation to the created order. God as First Cause orders all things to the good of the universe as a whole. This ordering includes the proper coordination of each nature's various powers toward a certain end. In the realm of non-rational creatures, this manifests itself in the individual creature's ability to pursue various secondary ends (through which the ultimate end is approached) through means indirectly ³ determined by God. In this way, no possible culpability exists in the non-rational creature's choice of ends nor choice of means, since in fact, no real ⁴ choice of either truly exists. In similar fashion, God's ordering has determined the end of rational beings, that is humanity, so that each human being has the same ultimate end ( ST I-II, q1.a7.) ⁵ , namely, the cultivation of its own perfection (i.e., imitating God; I-II, q2.a1.ad2um,3um). This results in man being free from culpability in regard to his choice of the end, since no real choice here exists.

But, as we have seen, the rational being is unique in its possession of the ability toward self-ordering, an ability which derives solely from the species' rational capacity to distinguish means from end. This capacity allows the individual to choose among various means to accomplish secondary ⁶ ends, which he likewise is able to distinguish and choose among, deliberating as to how they relate to the ultimate end. Here, the fact that God has determined an end for the human species, and this end is coordinated with other species' ends, so that all synchronize toward God's will for the the universe in general becomes a type of standard against which the rational individual's own choice of means and secondary ends in pursuit of its ultimate end may be considered worthy of praise or blame, and thereby culpable. In other words, to the degree that the individual's choice of secondary ends and means actually coincides with what God would order had He chosen to will so, is the same degree to which the individual's choices (hence actions) are culpable of praise or blame. This is complicated by the fact that although humans share the same end of attaining their perfection, not all have the same conception of human perfection and thus actually aim at different constitutive means ( ST I-II, q1.a7). This conceptual disagreement regarding what constitutes human perfection accounts for our experience of individuals' diverse pursuit of riches, power, fame, pleasure, relationships or God as the ends to be pursued. Culpability will exist, then, in our understanding of what the true end is, and our willingness to choose those means which best accomplish that end. Regarding the degree of culpability arising from cognition of the end, Aquinas will discuss the influence of (antecedent, consequent, and concomitant) ignorance. And regarding the degree of culpability in willing, Aquinas will discuss the influence of sensory passion (through distraction, contrariety, and bodily change). A third discussion by Aquinas pertains to those acts which are best described as motivated by malice. But these discussions are outside the immediate scope of this paper.

Aquinas' theory of human activity relies heavily upon an Aristotelian definition of a nature as a coordination of powers. From this, Aquinas derives both the nature of the end of humanity as perfection, due to its derivation in God, and the claim that only one end per specie is possible, due to the fact that what serves to coordinate the powers is a single goal of end. The Aristotelian scheme is not built upon the atomism which is prevalent in contemporary thought. Rather, both Aristotle and Aquinas build a teleological (end-oriented) theory of human action due to their hylomorphic intuition. This difference accounts for the seemingly dogmatic claim that each individual shares the same ultimate end with each other member of its species. And it is this unified end which serves as the very standard by which self-ordered acts are judged.

In contrast, atomistic theories will emphasize, not only individualism, but will favor mechanical explanations of human behavior rather than functional (teleological). In answer to the question, "Why did I choose A?", the atomist will find most plausible references to psychological, social, educational or religious principles, and go no further . Based on the relationship of the individual's activity to these principles, degree of culpability is best determined, rather than holding the individual culpable against a universal (i.e., specific) human standard regardless of the degree to which such immediately or mediately operating principles rightly reflect this standard.

The implications of the distinction between hylomorphism and atomism likewise carry over into the whole discussion of degrees of culpability as pertains to ignorance, sensory passion, and malice. For although it would at first appear that common ground might be struck regarding the decrease of culpability where specific types of ignorance are present, this agreement would quickly deteriorate when the issue of what is to be known is outlined. For again, Aquinas' entire concept of human nature is derived from the intuition of various powers coordinated toward one end, which is a hylomorphic and functional definition. Such a definition necessarily posits all natural phenomena as being subsumed under a higher order from which a purpose is derived. The individual's ignorance is ignorance of this very purpose. The atomist, however, prefers mechanistic definitions, such as the Freudian claim that values, behaviors, sexuality and religious inclinations all derive solely from biological and experiential factors. In such a view, although one is urged to understand one's own nature (atomistically), there is no basis for a specific nature shared by all individuals and against which the individual is held accountable.

It is my conclusion that Aquinas' theory is both accurate and adequate within a hylomorphic framework. Indeed, I believe that it is highly plausible and understandable. The real discussion, however, regarding its applicability and relevance to contemporary society will inevitably involve an initial attempt to determine whether atomism or hylomorphism most accurately describes reality as we intuit it. I am inclined to believe that hylomorphism is a more adequate model, and that it can be developed to incorporate the scientific data that we have accumulated thus far. I likewise believe it provides the human being, and all creatures with a dignity which the atomistic model can in no way provide. But I do not foresee contemporary society turning from atomism, and therefore, I doubt whether much from Aquinas' theory can be applied to the public sphere, save through individual acts by the hylomorphic remnant.