At times, Kilby appears to come close to anti-realists such as Cupitt or D.Z.Phillips  in acknowledging that the doctrine of the trinity “can have an important grammatical and structural role within Christianity whether or not it carries any insight.”[2] Rather like the poem ‘Jabberwocky’ by Lewis Carroll, Kilby argues that “we have a grammar for speaking of God, but no accompanying understanding.”[3] However she distances herself from a radical application of this approach more generally in theology, while remaining ‘sympathetic’ of those who do.[4] 

In this article I will attempt to argue that although Aquinas is informed by a long tradition of apophatic theology, he nevertheless makes a clear disjuncture from this tradition in at least three important ways, namely his distinctive doctrine of analogy, his emphasis on God’s revelation in Scripture and consequently his controlling hermeneutic of the plain sense of Scripture. Where Thomas runs into incoherence arises precisely where he attempts to square the circle of marrying the neo-Platonic doctrine of Divine simplicity with the Christian doctrine of the trinity. Contrary to his progressive instincts, Aquinas retreats back into apophaticism at this point because there is logically nowhere else for him to go.

The apophatic tradition.

Apophatic or negative theology (via negativa), dominant in the Eastern traditions of the Christian church and popularised through such writers as Pseudo-Dionysius, Maimonides, Gregory of Palamas, Nicholas de Cusa and St John of the Cross stresses the dissimilarity of God’s essence to our language about him. According to this view, the best we can say about God is what God is not rather than what God is. We cannot say that God is wise, but we can say that He is not stupid! This is the via negativa and appears to be endorsed in the prologue to Summa Theologiae. “We cannot know what God is, but only what He is not. So to study Him, we study what He has not -- such as composition and motion”.[5]  Alternatively and with more sophistication, we can resort to paradox: ‘neither x nor y’ but ‘beyond x and y’ (where x and y refer to attributes of God such as wise, good, atemporal etc.). This is the apophatic way, in that it is stressing not only the negative but also the apo, the beyondness of God to human discourse. Gregory of Nazianzus for instance compares himself to Moses ascending the Mount and hiding in the cleft of the Rock (Christ) before seeing God’s back parts only.[6]

It is probably fair to say that all theology is apophatic in one sense: God is infinitely more than our understanding and our language about him can ever be. God can never be reduced to our human concepts of Him. He dwells in unapproachable light.[7] The Cappodocean Fathers rightly draw us to a reverent humility and awe before the  eternal Majesty of the Almighty. Yet it should also be remembered that unlike Moses with whom Gregory compares the believer, we have not come to Mount Sinai but “to Mount Zion, the City of the living God..to Jesus the Mediator of the new covenant”. (Hebrews 12: 18, 22-24), the Mount, let us say, of revelation. In the words of Saint Paul, we may ‘see through a glass darkly’; nevertheless, this at least means that ‘ we know in part’.[8] I will discuss this qualification of apophaticism in more detail below in the section of Aquinas on revelation.

The Eastern tradition has a stronger definition of apophaticism than much Western theology would allow. It means total agnosticism regarding the ‘essence’ or nature of God.  Pseudo-Dionysius, a leading articulator of this position in the 6^th century famously applies apophasis even to God’s existence. “It (God) is the universal cause of existence while itself existing not, for it is beyond all being”[9] This is of course true if one means that God’s existence is necessary whereas creaturely existence is merely contingent. More contentiously however, and reminiscent of Buddhist thinking, Pseudo-Dionysius asserts that “the divine unity is beyond being…the indivisible Trinity holds within a shared undifferentiated unity……..the assertion of all things, the denial of all things, that which is beyond every assertion and denial.”[10] Similarly in The Mystical Theology he writes concerning the Cause of all being that:

 “we should posit and ascribe to it all the affirmations we make in regard to beings, and more appropriately, we should negate all these affirmations, since it surpasses all being. Now we should not conclude that the negations are simply the opposites of the affirmations, but rather that the cause of all is considerably prior to this, beyond privations, beyond every denial, beyond every assertion”[11]

 In this he parts company with Aristotle who argued that negations are the opposite of affirmations.[12] For Pseudo-Dionysius, God is beyond antithesis, logic and  the law of non-contradiction[13].  In this respect he finds new resonance in Continental and postmodern philosophy influenced by Hegelian synthesis[14] and the Nietzschean rejection of binary opposites.[15] So for example Sartre sounds remarkably Dionysian in Being and Nothingness  when he writes: “Being is equally beyond negation as beyond affirmation.”[16]

Aquinas, in contrast, (following Augustine), understood the laws of logic as necessary truths within the Divine mind: “necessary truths are eternal only because they exist in the eternal mind; nothing besides God is eternal.”[17] God is the Necessary Truth (John 14:6) on which logic depends. That is because He is the Logos (John 1:1). God can make no denial of himself (2 Tim 2:13) and cannot lie (Num 23:19; John 8:44-45). That is why, for Aquinas, there is no final conflict between the truths of faith and the truths of reason. The principles of reason have been Divinely implanted in us.[18]

In the so-called ‘Euthyphro’ dilemma, raised in Plato’s book by the same name, Socrates raises the puzzling riddle of whether something is pious or good because the gods command it or alternatively whether the gods command it because it is good. The same dilemma could be restated: ‘Does God follow the law of non-contradiction as a standard higher than himself or  is it only a law because God says so?’ Aquinas’ answer to both forms of the riddle was that God does not have goodness, reason or logic as separate qualities in the way that  human beings do. God has no composite qualities. He is absolutely Simple.[19] It follows therefore that, for God, to be is to be logical. He is his own goodness and love, reason and logic. The Word (Logos) was God (John 1:1). As Aquinas later expresses it: “..there is nothing in God that is not the divine being itself.”[20] Later I will suggest another way that Aquinas could have addressed the Euthyphro dilemma without resorting to a strong version of Divine Simplicity.

Thomas’ doctrine of analogy

In Summa Theologiae Aquinas discusses the issue of whether we have words for God[21]. He quotes Pseudo-Dionysius as an authority on this question[22]

“Of him (God) there is neither name or opinion”, and later "negations about God are true; but affirmations are vague (or, according to another translation, ‘incongruous’)."[23].

Thomas, like many in his day, mistakenly believed Dionysius  to be a first century convert of Paul with apostolic authority: It is all the more remarkable therefore that Thomas finds his position inadequate: “True affirmative propositions can be formed about God”[24], he counters, for example the affirmative proposition that ‘God is three and one’ or that he is ‘omnipotent’. Aquinas refers to positive theological statements in Scripture such as “The Lord is a great warrior: Almighty is his name” (Exodus 15:3). Church fathers like Augustine similarly applied positive predicates such as ‘strong’, ‘wise’ and ‘being’ to God.  It is clear then that the famous quotation from Aquinas in the Summa’s Prologue “We cannot know what God is, but only what He is not,” which Ward[25], McCabe[26]  and others use to defend a strong apophatic reading of Aquinas is not straightforwardly obvious in its meaning, and must be qualified.

 Since Aquinas had a more Aristotelian view of logic in his theology than Dionysius, it would be a fallacy, he reasons, to apply words such as ‘strong’, ‘wise’ and ‘being’ to God in an equivocal sense. This is a question still faced by Wittgensteinian fideists and anti-realists.  If God-talk is equivocal, why should we use these particular words rather than entirely opposite words or else no words at all? One can only fall back on the arbitrary authority of tradition in establishing the ‘grammar’ of theology, once a ‘correspondence’ account of truth has been abandoned.

This does not mean that Aquinas naïvely accepts that human language can be applied univocally (i.e. in exactly the same way) with respect to the infinite, transcendent God[27]. All human use of language derives from finite creaturely experience. God, in contrast, has a different mode of being[28] to creatures, since there is nothing in Him which is not Divine. This amongst other reasons[29], makes univocality impossible.

So, if language about God cannot be applied in the same way as language about the world (univocal), but neither can be applied in an entirely different way (equivocal), there appears to be logically only one possibility left, namely that language must have a similar meaning when applied to God.[30] One example of using terms similarly would be using the predicate  ‘bright’ to describe both the sun and a painting. The painting is bright in a similar (but immeasurably inferior) way to the brightness of the sun. Aquinas calls the relationship between the two senses  ‘analogical.’ He justifies this similarity  primarily on the grounds of a  diminished participation of the creature in its Creator.[31]  That is why A.N.Williams sees in this doctrine of analogy an essential component of Thomas’ understanding of the goal of existence: namely participation in the Divine Nature, to be fulfilled in the beatific vision.[32] Though Pseudo-Dionysius also speak of the Divine by way of analogy and metaphor[33], noone previously had clarified the concept as clearly as Aquinas did. It is his lasting contribution  to the religious language debate.

Yet, some critics have accused Aquinas of being incoherent here. They argue that an analogy can only work by presupposing some univocal correspondence, otherwise it reduces again to an equivocation.  The critics are correct, nevertheless Geisler suggests that Aquinas has already addressed this problem. Analogy does imply univocality to some extent, but this univocality is not in the realm of being, but in the realm of concepts and definitions. Aquinas is saying that concepts have the same definition for both humans and Creator but that they are applied differently[34]. (So God’s love is unlimited and perfect in contrast to human love). Aquinas explains:

“ In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to the same one thing; and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all.”[35]

He illustrates this principle with the example of the term ‘wise’:

“Thus also this term "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to God and to man.”[36]

Aquinas concedes along with the apophatic tradition that our intellect  “cannot see Him (God) as He is in Himself”, or at least not in this life, [37]but he draws different conclusions from the mystics by maintaining that the intellect  “knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions”.[38]  Just as we are able to understand lower material objects in a non-material mode while still affirming intellectually that they are in themselves material,[39] so according to Aquinas, we can understand transcendent concepts such as God being simple, even though our mode of understanding him is composite.[40]

For Aquinas then the via negativa comes into its own qualified and legitimate sphere in refining how concepts may or may not be applied to God, having stripped them of their empirical limitations. Only the perfection is to be applied and not the finite mode of signification.[41] This means that creatures can have the same characteristics as God (eg goodness), but not in the same way that God has them.  God has them in ‘the mode of supereminence’[42]. Aquinas adds that: “all perfections exist in creatures dividedly…and in God unitedly.”[43]

Thomas’ doctrine of analogy points to the understanding that God cannot be known infinitely or exhaustively,  for then humans would have to be omniscient[44], yet God can still be known truly.  This reading harmonises Thomas’ insistence that:

 “it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God”[45]  and that the name God is incommunicable. [46]

with his later qualification of this statement:

“this name God is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude…”[47]  Likewise, God is comprehensible to believers in contrast to ‘non-attainment’ but is incomprehensible in terms of ‘being included in the one comprehending.’[48]

Thus the apophatic proof text found in the prologue to the Summa Theologiae:  “We cannot know what God is, but only what He is not,”  should be contextually interpreted as meaning we cannot know anything about God in this life univocally but only either negatively or analogically.[49]  The more accessible work, Summa Contra Gentiles, makes this clearer. In the context of a discussion on names of perfections used in the mode of supereminence,  Aquinas uses the similar proposition to the Summa Theologiae:  “We cannot grasp what God is, but only what he is not”  except that, significantly here Aquinas adds the qualifying phrase, “and how other things are related to him.” [50] which signals a reference back to his doctrine of analogy.

Whether or not we can speak adequately about God in human language is inseparably connected with the question of whether or not God has spoken adequately to us in human language. This is the second disjuncture I note in Aquinas from absolute apophaticism: i.e. Aquinas’ emphasis on God as a God of revelation. If God has used language to communicate to us then it follows that this human language must be adequate to convey truth about God. Words about God may be anthropomorphic, but “God has anthropomorphised himself”[51], thus bridging the finite/infinite gap. In Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas concludes a chapter on reason and faith with a quotation from Paul:

“So the things that are of God no man knoweth but the the Spirit of God. But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit.”[52]

Furthermore, humans are theomorphic, made in the image of God, resulting in an ontology of participation. As previously noted, Thomas anticipates an ultimate climax to this participation in a full eschatological participation in the Divine nature leading to deiformity. God changes and indwells the  intellect of the redeemed, making their knowledge like his own. “When any created intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect.”[53]

Thomas Aquinas was known as magister in sacra pagina (Master of the sacred page). He was devoted to the study of Scripture. As a Dominican friar he was required to expound the sacred writings between one and four times a week and as a Master Teacher his duty was to read the text to his pupils explaining its sense and application. [54] This resulted in his writing numerous commentaries as well as the famous Catena aurea (Golden Chain) of the four Gospels.

Aquinas’  devout practice embodied his profound conviction that the Bible is God’s revelation to humanity. “Revelation is the basis of sacred scripture”[55] he wrote, since “The author of Holy Scripture is God”[56] Curiously, a modern scholar of Aquinas seems to overlook this fact and instead  project his own Barthian understanding of Scripture onto Aquinas:

“For Thomas, then, Scripture is not of itself revelation so much as the bearer of revelation, rather as in a dependent way (dependent upon both God and Scripture), the church is the bearer of revelation, too”[57]

In contrast to this neo-orthodox view of the Bible as a human witness to the Word, however, Aquinas insisted that the Bible is ‘Divinely inspired Scripture’[58], quoting 2 Timothy 3:16 (‘All Scripture is inspired by God’). Without this revelation, Aquinas points out that God’s truth would only be known by a few and would be mixed with much error.[59] Furthermore, in discussing the relationship of sacred knowledge in scripture to the other sciences, Aquinas teaches: “Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from any human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order”.[60] This does not preclude the fact that for Aquinas God has also revealed himself in nature (a point also accepted by Dionysius), but that some truths, for example the truth of the incarnation or  that ‘God is trinity’, can only be accessed through special revelation. Although there are ‘vestiges’ of the trinity in nature[61], natural revelation and unaided reason are insufficient for arriving at this truth.[62]

 Again, unlike the later Barthians, Aquinas held to the inerrancy of scripture: “nothing false can underlie the literal sense of Scripture”[63]. Concerning the books of Scripture, he writes, “I firmly believe that none of their authors have erred in composing them”[64] Indeed, “It is heretical to say that any falsehood whatsoever is contained either in the gospels or in any canonical scripture.”[65]

None of this sits easily with the Neo-Platonic roots of apophaticism. Plotinus (d AD 270), the father of neo-Platonism, described a hierarchy of being descending from the ineffable One who is wholly other to the base world of matter.[66] There is no conception of the One revealing (him)self in neo-Platonism. The One is rather beyond all knowledge and being. “The One is in truth beyond all statement”.[67] Even the title ‘One’ is only a negation of plurality. “If we are led to think positively of the One, name and thing, there would be more truth in silence.”[68] Anticipating Kierkegaard, Plotinus writes of the necessity of transcending reason in order to ‘know’ this One: “only by a leap can we reach to this One which is to be pure of all else.”[69] Hence self-authenticating mystical experience is privileged over reason within this tradition.

On the one hand Thomas remains tied to neo-Platonism in his belief that God cannot be known in his ‘essence’, but only through his ‘effects, either of nature or of grace’[70] yet begins to free himself from these strictures in his Christian confession of a God who has made himself known in the person of Jesus Christ who himself used human language to communicate God’s mind.

Thomas on the plain sense of Scripture

A third important way in which Aquinas began to break from previous apophatics was his emphasis on the plain meaning of the text of Scripture. Consistent with Aquinas’ dual basis of the analogical nature of religious language and the fact of propositional revelation, it is unsurprising that Aquinas also insists upon the intelligibility of God’s written revelation.

Later reformers such as Luther and Calvin criticised mystical writers of the middle ages such as Pseudo-Dionysius (‘whoever he may have been’), for their  fanciful allegorisation of Bible passages[71], insisting instead upon “the proper and simple sense of Scripture”.[72] Yet Aquinas should be credited with paving the way for this approach. Just as the  speculative allegorisation of texts by the mystics was entirely consistent with their presuppositions regarding the mystery of the Divine being and the inadequacy of human language to describe him; conversely Aquinas with his presupposition of the Bible as revelation in analogical language followed this through consistently with his insistence on the plain meaning of the text as the controlling sense.

One may also note the link here between Pseudo-Dionysius’ allegorisation of Scripture and his hierarchicalism. Dionysius is credited with coining the term ‘hierarchy’; it is so central to his thinking, and occurs in the title of two of his works. His ecclesiastical hierarchy corresponds closely to Plato’s political hierarchy headed up by the Philosopher-King. In his book, The Celestial Hierarchy, Dionysius explicitly segregates the enlightened ones from the common masses:

“it is most fitting to the mysterious passages of scripture that the sacred and hidden truth about the celestial intelligences be concealed through the inexpressible and the sacred and be inaccessible to the hoi polloi. Not everyone is sacred, and, as scripture says, knowledge is not for everyone.”[73]

It must be conceded that Aquinas, as a man of his time was not immune to an hierarchical worldview. He still admired Pseudo-Dionysius (falsely considering him apostolic) and answered  a question himself with eight articles to the hierarchical ordering of the nine choirs of angels.[74] Nevertheless, one can see a radically new direction emerging in Aquinas when he observes that natural reason alone, without ‘supernatural inspiration as an object of belief’, would have the ‘awkward consequence’ that ‘few men would possess the knowledge of God.’[75] Aquinas’ emphasis on the plain sense of Scripture blew open the door for the later Reformers to champion the democratisation of the knowledge of God [76]

Karen Kilby is also concerned to avoid ‘privileging the theologian.’ She associates a graspable understanding of  (Trinitarian) doctrine with the social Trinitarians and acknowledges this as a possible solution. Her sensibilities however incline her to level things out for the ordinary believer in the admission of absolute mystery for all.[77] My contention is that this does not appear to be Aquinas’ initial methodology, but I will qualify this claim in my conclusion.  

Modern exponents of a plain sense of Scripture are often portrayed as doing ‘violence’ to the text of Scripture by insisting on a ‘singular’ meaning.[78] However, this would be a straw man argument  if applied to Aquinas. Aquinas accepts that “in Holy Scripture a word may have several senses.”[79] As a result he is not dogmatic in favouring say an interpretation of Augustine as opposed to Basil or other eastern fathers.[80]The different senses may include for example a typological, moral or eschatological sense. Together they may present a ‘sensus plenus’, yet the important thing for Aquinas is that the primary and controlling meaning remains the literal  meaning[81].

Thomas’ dependence on extra-Biblical philosophy

It is unfortunate, then, that Aquinas is not always consistent with his own methodology. At times he operates with a controlling hermeneutic not of the plain sense of scripture, but of ad extra philosophical constructs such as Divine Simplicity. Karen Kilby rightly observes that problems occur (or at least get worse) when Aquinas moves from a discussion of Biblical words like ‘Father’, ‘Son’ and ‘ Holy Spirit’ to a more abstract dimension of Trinitarian reflection.

I will focus on just one example of this: namely Thomas’ treatment of the Divine persons as ‘subsisting relations’.[84] Kilby traces this idea first to Gregory of Nazianzus and then to Augustine. She goes on to contrast this with the so-called ‘social Trinitarian’ model of three ‘somethings’ united in love. Aquinas appears to be exclusively speaking of ‘relations without relata’, a thought which is unthinkable for the human imagination (and hence enters the realm of the apophatic). I think this assessment is accurate in regards to Aquinas, but that he has also mutated the tradition in a significant way.

Aquinas begins with the Boethian definition of person: ‘persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia.’ as a translation of the Greek hypostasis which Thomas further defines as ‘an individual in the genus of substance’.[85] This does not suggest relations without remainder but rather indicates an individual existence for each hypostasis. However, in light of what we have argued earlier regarding Thomas’ doctrine of analogy defining terms univocally and then applying them in the ‘mode of supereminence’, Aquinas appears to apply the term ‘persons’ to God exclusively as ‘relations’(‘persona est relatio’),[86]. He is attempting to strip the term of its empirical limitations, leaving only the perfection and not the finite mode of signification.  McCabe comments:

“Aquinas quotes with ostensible approval Boethius’ definition of a person as ‘an individual substance of rational nature.’ But, as speedily emerges, the ‘persons’ of the Trinity are not individuals, not substances, not rational and do not have natures. What Aquinas labours to show is that in this unique case ‘person’ can mean relation.”[87]

An investigation of the trajectory of ‘persons as relations’ within the tradition however reveals that Aquinas’ reductionist interpretation is a novelty. [88]  Augustine, for example, who also deployed the language of relations could at the same time still link these to their relata.[89] So in De Trinitate he writes:

“..every being that is called something by way of relationship is also something besides the relationship; thus a master is also a man, and a slave is a man…….If the Father is not also something with reference to himself, there is nothing there to be talked about with reference to something else.”[90]

Commenting on the Augustinian understanding in contrast to that of Aquinas, Moltmann writes:

“…this relational understanding of the Persons has as its premise the ‘substantial’ interpretation of their individuality; the one does not replace the other.”[91]

Similarly, it is significant that Gregory of Nyssa who defended the ‘relations’ idea is also one of the most explicit proponents of the ‘threeness’ of the Godhead to the extent that he had to defend himself from those who accused him of preaching three Gods[92]. Likewise Basil[93] speaks boldly (and by modern Barthian standards somewhat crudely) of Peter, Andrew and John united by the common predicate ‘man’ as an analogy of Father, Son and Spirit united in the one nature ‘God.’[94] This very clearly avoids modalism and is consistent with those theologians who speak of the persons in terms of three ‘centres of consciousness’[95], or three ‘Subjects’ and ‘centres of action’[96].  Aquinas’ weakness is that his model precludes any such description.

 A primary consideration for the shift to a reductionist interpretation of persons in terms of ‘relations’ seems to be for Aquinas his commitment to a strong form of Divine simplicity. This states not only that God, as an immaterial mind, is not composed of parts ( a weak form of Divine Simplicity), but also the strong claim that God is identical with all his properties and that in some ineffable way they all identical with one another, so that it would be more accurate to say apophatically that God does not have any properties. This doctrine is so fundamental for Aquinas that he deals with it as of first importance in Summa Theologiae 1a, Question 3. “since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite.”[97]

Although attractive for Christian apologetics in providing a possible solution to the Euthyphro dilemma and in strengthening the cosmological argument, this doctrine of God has the weakness of  not being taught in the Scriptures themselves. It has been questioned in modern times not only by the radical Process theologians such as Hartshorne[98] and Griffin[99], but also by more conservative scholars such as Moltmann[100], Ward[101], Pannenberg[102], and Plantinga.[103]

It is not difficult to trace this doctrine back through the mystical tradition of Pseudo-Dionysius (c.500 AD.) to the neo-Platonist Plotinus (204-270AD) and beyond to the pre-Socratic Parmenides (c.515-440 BC). Indeed the whole mystical tradition could be seen as a ‘series of footnotes to Parmenides’ (to misquote A.N. Whitehead)! Parmenides poem ‘On Nature’ refers to the simplicity of The One in Fragment 8:

“Nor is it divisible, since it all alike is;

 Nor is it somewhat more here, which would keep it from holding together,

Nor is it somewhat less, but it is all full of what is.”[104]

Parmenides argues that the One must be indivisible, otherwise in one place it would be one thing and in another would not.  Yet for Parmenides it is not possible to speak of what is not (being non-existent) and therefore reality must be one indivisible plenum.

Interestingly, Aquinas turns the premise of Parmenides on its head: God is wholly simple therefore  we can only speak of what God is not and not what He is (univocally)!  For Parmenides, on the other hand, it is impossible to  speak of what is not therefore the One must be wholly simple (indivisible). In order to avoid the post-hoc fallacy then we must admit that Aquinas inherits Parmenides’ One only indirectly through Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius.

Of course it would also be a genetic fallacy to conclude that the doctrine of simplicity in Aquinas must be false solely on the basis that we can explain its origin. What we do observe, however, is that Aquinas struggles to squeeze the doctrine of the Trinity into this alien mould of Parmenidean simplicity – which is really a radical Unity without distinctions,  rather than submit this construct itself to the revealed ontology of the Tri-unity manifested in the ‘history of God’[105]. In other words, we can only truly understand the immanent trinity by means of the economic trinity as revealed in Jesus Christ and the outpouring of the Spirit.

The traditional doctrine of the trinity, in contrast to the heresy of modalism, associated with Sabellius in the early third century AD, demands that there are real distinctions in God (and therefore real generation and real procession). Modalism teaches that ultimately God is only one person. In order to hold onto orthodoxy, Aquinas agrees in Summa Theologiae that “relations exist in God really.”[106] and that:

“if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is the error of Sabellius.”[107]

The problem with Aquinas, is not in what he says, but in what he also says. Aquinas’ instinct, arising from the organising principle of Simplicity, leads him towards  the very modalism he seeks to avoid,  when he asserts, “it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility.”[108]

Aquinas illustrates his position with Aristotle’s example of action, passion and motion to show that fatherhood and sonship are logically distinct in a similar way.[109] This could be criticised however as pointing to the conclusion that God is one person (in the modern sense of the term) with logically distinct self-relations. In other words, this still leads to Sabellianism.

Cornelius Plantinga observes that, to avoid modalism, it is not enough for Aquinas simply to show that these relations are logically distinct, Aquinas must show that they are really distinct[110].

Instead, Thomas presents a position which appears to endorse two mutually incompatible beliefs: namely that subsisting relations really differ from each other and not only in our understanding but also that they differ only in our understanding. Karen Kilby observes the same dilemma in her essay.[111]

Another problem not addressed by Thomas is how, within his model of the Trinity, the Son can know that he is the Son and distinct from the Father? and how the father can know that he is the Father and distinct from the Son when according to simplicity there is only one knowledge and one consciousness?

It is noteworthy that Aquinas’ contemporary Dominican, Meister Eckhart (1260–c. 1328) followed Divine Simplicity to its more consistent and logical conclusion, seeing in the concept of the Trinity a mere representation of the Father as knowledge, the Son as Life and the Holy Spirit as Being beneath which lies a Unity without distinction (‘unum non unus’).[112] One of the articles for which he was condemned as a heretic by Pope John XXII was that:

“24. Every distinction is alien to God, both in his nature and in the persons. The proof: since His nature itself is one (una) and this very One (unum), and each Person is one and this same One as the nature.”[113]

The principle of ‘Ockham’s Razor’), that ‘all things being equal, the simplest explanation is the best’, is named after another contemporary of Eckhart’s: the Franciscan, William of Ockham But Ockham’s Razor is itself is a logical fallacy. It led Ockham down a different, but analogous error to Eckhart by denying that properties or concepts exist except in name only. This  ‘Nominalist’ school prefigures in many ways the later reductionism of Logical Positivism and scientism. In his award winning poem, ‘Snow’, poet Louis MacNiece challenges an oversimplification of reality.

“…World is crazier and more of it than we think. Incorrigibly plural.” [114]

Conclusion

The result of Aquinas proving too much is an intractable set of difficulties for his doctrine of the Trinity which are highlighted in Karen Kilby’s article, and can only be accommodated within the apophaticism which she personally endorses. I have argued however in this paper that in at least three areas: namely his doctrine of analogy, belief in revelation and the plain sense of Scripture, Aquinas has made great strides to escape from the confines of the type of apophaticism taught by mystics like Plotinus or Pseudo-Dionysius.  As a child of his time, however, he never completely succeeded. He did not work through the full implications of his insights regarding the controlling authority of the revealed words, because, to borrow a phrase from Wittgenstein, ‘a picture held him captive’: primarily the extra-Biblical ‘picture’ of absolute Divine Simplicity. This paper has argued that this picture is fundamentally at odds with the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity[116], being more consistent with Sabellianism, and lands Aquinas having to defend mutually incompatible views. The only way out for Aquinas it seems, is to take refuge, (unfortunately, in my view), within the fog of apophatic theology, with its claims that God is in essence unknowable.

In this article, it is inquired which reasons are decisive for acting in accordance with divine commands, and whether these can be regarded as moral reasons; the emphasis lies on Christianity. To this effect, the position of God as a – basic – lawgiver is expounded, with special attention to the role His power plays. By means of an account of the grounds given (in the Bible) to obey God, the selfish motives in this respect are brought to light. It is questioned whether any other elements can be discerned, particularly from a meta-ethical perspective.

Introduction

An appeal to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ actions in religions is evident. Stealing, e.g., is considered to be wrong, whereas giving to the poor is prescribed as good. In this article, I will examine to what extent it may be maintained that such moral elements are indeed inherent in divine commands or exhortations; I will focus on the Christian faith. In section 1, two positions are outlined. Those who indicate some things to be good or bad as such, irrespective of God’s ruling, and the thinkers who emphasize God’s radical power and who state that God decides these matters, thus arguing a radical omnipotence, are juxtaposed, although their positions may not differ greatly from an ethical (or meta-ethical) viewpoint.

Section 2 is focused on the consequences of these alternative outlooks. If there are such things as good and bad actions, it is important to find out whether these are respectively prescribed and abhorred (subsection 2.1). A number of Biblical passages may illustrate the reasons to display a certain behavior. Subsection 2.2 briefly explores the second perspective stated in section 1.

Section 3 presents an alternative; the goal is to be as critical as possible in analyzing the reasons to adhere to the commands one is to obey. In particular, it is inquired which role selfishness plays; is an act of altruism possible? I have not limited the research to religion here, but have tried to find a broader scope. In section 4, some relevant remaining meta-ethical questions are dealt with. Some Christian philosophers have, e.g., appealed to intuitions in order to account for the existence of goodness.

In this article, I attempt to approach matters with an open view, not dismissing any position a priori. This should lead to a consistent whole and to credible results.

1. The nature of ‘goodness’ from a religious perspective

The main question addressed in this article, whether moral acts can be performed within a religious scope, raises the subsequent one on what basis goodness can be acknowledged to exist. Whether this can exist at all is a more fundamental question, which will be dealt with later, though it is connected with the issue of the source of goodness, which is the subject-matter of this section.

In Christian philosophy, two positions can rudimentarily be distinguished. On the one hand, it is stated that goodness exists as such, God’s commands reflecting this. On the other hand, it is deemed to be at God’s disposal to determine which acts are good and which aren’t, rendering goodness contingent in this respect. (The issue already, in nuce, receives attention from Plato; in an early work, the question is put forward whether something is approved of by the gods because it is pious, or, conversely, pious because they approve of it.[1]) Of course, middle positions are also possible and have even been defended, but as this is of minor relevance to this article, I will merely deal with the two options mentioned.

Bonaventura’s line of thought is an example of the first position. He limits God’s power by stating:

“God is omnipotent, but in such a way that no culpable acts are attributed to Him, such as lying and wanting evil.” (“[…] Deus est omnipotens, ita tamen, quod ei non attribuuntur actus culpabiles, utpote mentiri et malle velle […].”);[2] “God’s will is so right that it can in no way stray.” (“[Voluntas Dei] sic est recta, ut nullo modo potest obliquari […].”)[3]

 A (or the) right way to act is presupposed here, independent of God’s decisions. Further,

“The divine omnipotence, through everything, is irreprehensible, since it only prescribes, prohibits, or suggests justly; it merely acts in a good way, and permits nothing unjustly.” (“[Divina omnipotentia] per omnia est irreprehensibilis, quia nihil nisi iuste praecipit, prohibit, vel consulit; nihil agit nisi bene, nihil permittit iniuste.”)[4]

This presupposes a (or the) just way to proceed, again independent of God’s decisions. In a similar vein, Thomas Aquinas indicates some acts to be good or bad by their kind. (“[…] Quidam actus sunt boni ex genere […]; quidam vero sunt actus mali ex genere […].”)[5]

Even Damiani, famous for his emphasis on God’s omnipotence,[6] maintains that God can’t perform an evil act:

“It is clear that God is unable to do something bad, just as He is ignorant in this regard. For He is unable to lie, or commit perjury, or do something unjust, nor does He know how to.” (“[…] Videlicet quicquid malum est, sicut non [Deus] potest agere, ita nescit agere. Non enim potest aut scit mentiri, vel peiurare, vel iniustum aliquid facere.”)[7]

It would not contribute to God’s power to engage in such actions, so His being unable to perform them does not conflict with His omnipotence. From Damiani’s presentation it appears that his view is similar to Bonaventura’s with regard to the existence of goodness (and evil). Leibniz presents an additional argument:

“If it were the case that the works of God are merely good because of the formal reason that God has performed them, God, knowing that He is their creator, would only have to observe them afterwards, and deem them good. […] Furthermore, by saying that things aren’t good by any standard of goodness, but by God’s will only, one destroys, is seems to me, without thinking, the entire love of God and His entire glory.” (“Dieu sçachant qu’il en est l’auteur, n’avoit que faire de les regarder par après, et de les trouver bons […]. Aussi, disant que les choses ne sont bonnes par aucune regle de bonté, mais par la seule volonté de Dieu, on détruit, ce me semble, sans y penser, tout l’amour de Dieu, et toute sa gloire.”)[8]

Leibniz, then, emphasizes the content of goodness and on that ground wants to cling to an absolute standard by which God abides.

By contrast, one may argue that God’s power is not limited in this respect, nor should it be, God Himself determining what it is for something to be good at all. Biel states, e.g., that it follows from God’s omnipotence that He can command someone to lie without this resulting in a sin.[9] Accordingly, that it is forbidden to lie – “Neither shalt thou bear false witness against thy neighbor.” (Deuteronomy 5:20) – is a random given. God decides completely unhindered what ‘good’ and ‘bad’ mean. This is also Descartes’ view:

“[…] There can be nothing whatsoever which does not depend on God. This applies not just to everything that subsists, but to all order, every law, and every reason for anything’s being true or good. If this were not so, then […] God would not have been completely indifferent with respect to the creation of what he did in fact create. If some reason for something’s being good had existed prior to his preordination, this would have determined God to prefer those things which it was best to do. But on the contrary, just because he resolved to prefer those things which are now to be done, for this very reason, in the words of Genesis, ‘they are very good’; in other words, the reason for their goodness depends on the fact that he exercised his will to make them so.”[10]

It is difficult to assess the merits of these positions with regard to their claims on God’s options and (possible) limitations. This would require a more intricate metaphysical theory than I would pretend to be able to proffer here; moreover, these thinkers do not, perhaps with the exception of Leibniz, really produce arguments why their position should be correct and, even if they had done so, in the absence of a covering, or – as is pertinent to this issue – God’s eye view, the matter can’t be resolved with a metaphysical analysis.

It is, however, possible to evaluate the positions from a meta-ethical point of view.[11] According to the first approach, good and bad exist as absolute standards.[12] An account is needed why it is good to, e.g., give almonds to the poor, or bad to lie. In the next section, a number of Biblical sections will be explored in order to find out whether an answer to this question can be found there. According to the second approach, in which God determines what ‘good’ and ‘bad’ actions are, an external criterion to obey Him is not available as it is supposed to be in the first approach, so the question why this should be done presents itself.

2. The two options explored

In this section, I will try to establish the tenability of the two positions outlined in the previous section. Firstly, I will, in subsection 2.1, evaluate the claims of those who argue that goodness as such exists from a religious (mainly Christian) point of view, and that it may provide a basis for acting. Secondly, the basis of God’s position as a fundamental lawgiver, to which the defenders of the second position adhere, will be investigated in subsection 2.2. Admittedly, the Bible – presumably having been written in an accessible style – doesn’t convey a philosophical message,[13] but that doesn’t mean that the texts should not be analyzed critically.

2.1. The basic ‘goodness’ as a motivational element

There are a number of Biblical passages in which ‘good’ deeds are prescribed and ‘bad’ ones are forbidden. I will argue that the basis for complying with the norms according to which one is to behave and abstaining from those one is to avoid has a different basis than an acknowledgement of their being ‘correct’ (or ‘right’) respectively ‘wrong’.

The revelation of the Ten Commandments is an obvious place to start. These are presented as the fundamental directives God imposes upon man. According to the first option, there would be something inherently ‘good’ in obeying these commandments, or inherently ‘wrong’ in disobeying them. It is clear that adhering to most, or possibly all of them would contribute to a stable society. The interdiction to murder (Deuteronomy 5:17), e.g., will, if observed, lead to a peaceful society in which people can prosper. It is, however, difficult to support the claim that the Commandments are supposed to represent moral values.

Some of the Commandments are not motivated but simply postulated; they can’t be helpful to this inquiry. In the case of blasphemy, conversely, a reason is given. This consists in the fact that “[…] the Lord will not hold him guiltless who takes His name in vain.” (Deuteronomy 5:11). In this case, then, the (concealed) penalty which is to be bestowed upon the blasphemer is the basis for keeping to the norm. Similar accounts are given in Deuteronomy 28:15-68, where the curses for disobedience are described.

In the New Testament, the negative effects of failing to comply are, on the whole, less pungent than in the Hebrew Bible and are presented more subtly. Still, the basis analysis is the same. Matthew 7:1-2 reads: “Judge not, that ye be not judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.” The second verse gives the explanation – one shouldn’t judge because of the negative effects for oneself – but even the first verse points to this: there is a necessary connection between the imperative and the consequence by the use of the conjunction ‘that’ (‘hina’).[14] It is hard, then, to evade the conclusion that self-interest is the motivation to comply. This is also the way the ‘golden rule’[15] is to be interpreted.[16]

There are also passages in which the negative element is stressed – e.g., Matthew 26:52 (“[…] All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword.”) – but the analysis is the same here: don’t partake in ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’ actions because they will reflect on you.[17]

The positive elements, i.e., those which point to rewards, evince the same analysis as the penal ones outlined above. To commence again with the Ten Commandments, the Fifth is “Honor thy father and thy mother, as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee; that thy days may be prolonged, and that it may go well with thee, in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.” (Deuteronomy 5:16). In this case, the reason for keeping to the Commandment appears to be that a reward will follow. No intrinsic reason is given[18][19] (which may be impossible at any rate, but that will be dealt with further on).

The general motivation is presented in Deuteronomy 29:9: “Keep […] the words of this covenant, and do them, that ye may prosper in all that ye do.”[20] The reward for believing and acting as God commands lies in being saved (e.g., Matthew 6:1-6, 7:21, 21:21-22; Romans 10:9).[21] It is stated in Luke 6:35: “[…] Love ye your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again […].” This seems not to appeal to any positive results for the actor. Still, the passage continues “[…] and your reward shall be great, and ye shall be the children of the Highest: for he is kind unto the unthankful and to the evil.” As the conjunction connecting the sections is a neutral one in this case (‘kai’ (‘and’)), not introducing a final clause (as in the case of Matthew 7:1 mentioned above), one might argue that there is no necessary link with the agreeable consequences. It would be difficult, however, to find another reason than this for someone to be so kind to his enemies as is prescribed. One would have to appeal to some sort of ‘goodness’ or altruism, both of which are problematic, as will be pointed out in sections 3 and 4, respectively. First, the second possibility, ‘good’ actions being such as a result of God’s decree, needs to be examined.

2.2. God as the basic legislator

The interpretation of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ actions of the previous subsection amounts to the conclusion that the basis for acting or refraining lies in the penalty or reward which may result from it. The question is whether the second position, according to which God decides what it means for something to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’, may provide another analysis.

A basic given is God’s power to both reward and punish (Deuteronomy 11:26-28).[22] God’s power is continuously implicit in this interpretation; if the Ten Commandments do not attest of values which are good as such (as in the first interpretation), their enforcement is an all the more pressing issue. It is, then, incumbent on man to fear God (Deuteronomy 6:2, 10:12-13; Matthew 10:28). One may argue that Abraham, when commanded by God to sacrifice Isaac (Genesis 22:2-10), intended to do so on the following basis: “Why […] does Abraham do it? For God’s sake and – the two are wholly identical – for his own sake. He does it for God’s sake because God demands this proof of his faith; he does it for his own sake so that he can prove it.”[23] Nevertheless, it is the fear of God that is presented by God as the crucial reason: “And he said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou any thing unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son from me.” (Genesis 22:12). Finally, even the man at the cross beside Christ who showed remorse[24] refers to the fear of God (Luke 23:40-42).

The problem is evident: if the reason one is to obey God lies in His position as a legislator (and final judge), there doesn’t seem to be a moral criterion. It is simply God’s power, and not His or another goodness, which is decisive.[25] His authority would be analogous to that of the human legislator. This is an important given which is to be explored in section 3.

3.1. Selfishness as the pivotal element

Now that the two positions have been explored, it is time to evaluate them, as will be done in this subsection and the next. The problem with the first position appears to be that no explanation is given why something is good. The Bible mentions the knowledge of good and Evil (Genesis 2:17, 3:5), but this isn’t explicated. One might try to appeal to a common sense-approach, which may have been discounted in the places referred to in subsection 2.1. The fact that the consequences for the actor are mentioned should then be ignored, but it is worthwhile to inquire whether this may be a viable option.

It seems obvious that, e.g., it is a good thing to give to the poor and a bad thing to commit murder. If the reasons why one acts or abstains are investigated, however, the issue may turn out to be more intricate than it may seem to be at first. In this case, the self-interest I made explicit in the previous section (where, e.g., the rewards given by God are decisive) is not at stake, as I already indicated not to focus on it for now.

A first option is that one simply gives to the poor because one may at some point in the future be poor oneself; for that reason, one wants others to remember one’s deed so that they (themselves having acquired enough means in the meantime) will reciprocate, perhaps for the same reason one oneself gave in the first place. The act then becomes one of insurance, really; one isn’t sure whether one will fall on bad times, but should such a situation arise, it is nice to know there is a chance one won’t be deprived of the basic[26] needs. The situation is, of course, optimal if one doesn’t have to rely on the other party’s willingness to return the favor or contributing for another reason and one lives in a society with a relatively stable system of distribution.

Such a system of distribution has been implemented and expanded in the developed countries.[27] In this case, one merely contributes (e.g., through taxes) because of the safety-net which is provided for oneself. (There are those who are rich enough not to have to worry and whose position might only be in danger in case of an emergency, but they don’t have the option not to contribute. They simply pay because their voice isn’t strong enough or, put differently, their view isn’t represented to a great enough extent in the political process.)

A second option consists in giving to someone one cares about, like a friend.[28] Is self-interest at stake here? The difficulty lies in the qualification of ‘self’. I won’t expound a discourse here that would diverge too much from the current theme, but the question whether one considers a friend (or, e.g., one’s wife, or a family member) as exhibiting a special position is a relevant one. The sort of relation there is to another person seems, in many cases, to matter to one’s attitude towards him or her. One may argue, then, that in this case self-interest is displayed, albeit not self-interest in the sense that only the actor is at stake (abandoning his friend, wife or family member if that should prove to be most advantageous) but in the sense that one is connected to another person and on that basis wants him or her to prosper.

This does, of course, call for a division within the notion of ‘self-interest’; this variant may be dubbed ‘indirect self-interest’ rather than direct self-interest (by ‘direct self-interest’ I understand the self-interest which is at stake when one intends to serve one’s own needs).[29] After all, the action isn’t directed at a random person but just at someone whose interest one wants to promote. In other words, it is in one’s (indirect) self-interest that the (direct) self-interest of the other party is served. This even extends to dying for one’s friends (John 15:13), which means that one considers one’s indirect self-interest more important than one’s direct self-interest. Of course, it is conceivable that someone (aspires to) include everyone in his or her circle of intimates, but this is immaterial to the analysis: it merely means that many beings are involved; the motivation is no different than in cases in which a small number of beings are at stake.

A third option is to focus on the situation rather than on the quality of the relation. One may experience sympathy when one observes how someone one doesn’t even know suffers as a result of his or her lack of means. Does this point altruism? The etymology of ‘sympathy’ is helpful here. The word ‘sympathy’ is a compound of ‘sun’ (‘together’) and ‘pathos’ (‘feeling’ or ‘suffering’).[30] If one takes this seriously, it is the suffering of oneself in observing the struggles of someone else that is at stake; the person in distress and the observer both suffer (albeit in different respects). This means that it is really one’s own suffering one wants to alleviate. No ‘good’ deeds are involved.[31]

3.2. A Satanic Stance

If God is the propagator of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and if His power is the decisive element (cf. subsection 2.2), a number of confronting questions are raised. Hobbes’s stance is helpful in this regard. In his view, the reason to abstain from malicious acts is that these may have negative effects for oneself: “The institution of eternal punishment was before sin, and had regard to this only, that men might dread to commit sin for the time to come.”[32] ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ are interpreted as subjective[33] until the legislator creates an – artificial – standard.[34]

As Hobbes maintains that man only acts in his own interest,[35] it is not surprising that it is God’s power which is decisive:

“The right of nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that break his Lawes, is to be derived not from his Creating them, as if he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits; but from his Irresistible Power.”[36]

In subsections 2.1 and 3.1, the problems with the criterion which focuses on the content of the norm to which one is to adhere were brought to light. If the criterion (God’s position as a legislator) also fails to display a moral element, why would it be moral to obey God? In fact, if the power criterion is determinative, one might argue that it would be incumbent on man, acting in his self-interest, to obey Satan, if he should prove to be more powerful than God. Just to be clear, this is not what I myself propose. After all, if the Christian doctrine is correct, God is more powerful than Satan (cf., e.g., Job 1:12, Revelation 12:8-9); and if it is not, I am not inclined to such a course of action on the basis of any conviction. In fact, with regard to the question whether God (or Satan, for that matter) exists, I must suspend my judgment as I have no means to establish His existence or non-existence. It may be objected that such a conviction is present in some who on that basis still find a reason to act in accordance with God’s dictates; they are presumed to simply grasp that it is good (or bad) to do something and to find a directive on that basis. I will try to counter such an objection in section 4.

4. Meta-ethical considerations

In order to attempt to unnerve the results reached in the foregoing, one might try to appeal to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (or ‘evil’). Don’t the issues mentioned attest of these notions? Isn’t it, e.g., simply good to give to the poor? From an ethical point of view, this may indeed be argued. At that level, the pivotal question is: ‘what is good?’; one seeks to do good things. The meta-ethical question, and that is the one at stake here, is: ‘what is ‘good’?’ The meaning (if any) of the ethical notions is concerned.

One may adduce that it is not because of the agreeable results that one acts but, conversely, that rewards are sought because they are considered good.[37] In a similar vein, it may be stated that

“it is necessary for evil men to be unhappier when they have accomplished what they longed for than if they might be unable to implement the things they long for.” (“[…] Infeliciores esse necesse est malos cum cupita perfecerint, quam si ea quae cupiunt implere non possint.”)[38]

Augustine indicates that happiness is only attainable for those who do not seek after evil.[39]

The problem in these accounts is that they presuppose the existence of good and evil; it isn’t clarified how this may be maintained and what it means. If these notions can’t be maintained for that reason, does that also mean that the difference between doing something out of selfish motives and for a moral reason is cancelled, reducing the latter to the former? Abelard makes the following distinctions:

“[…] Repentance at one happens out of love for God and is fruitful, at another because of some penalty with which we do not want to be burdened […].”;[40] “Daily […] we see many about to depart from this life repenting of their shameful accomplishments and groaning with great compunction, not so much out of love of God whom they have offended or out of hatred of the sin which they have committed as out of fear of the punishment into which they are afraid of being hurled.”[41]

Assuming one acts out of love of God, if one does, it is not the direct self-interest which is concerned (as would be the case if one were to act to avoid punishment), but the indirect self-interest (cf. subsection 3.1). One simply prefers acting out of love of God to sinning. Of course, it may be objected that one has faith without being able to know (through reason) whether one will be rewarded or punished. Doesn’t this evince the righteousness of the believer? Firstly, if this is his position, his faith is blind; he has no ground to believe in anything rather than in anything else and any conviction (if one may call it that) he has is random. The religion to which he adheres is interchangeable for another, precisely because of the fact that he has no reason to cling to one rather than to another.[42] Secondly, this course of action doesn’t appear to differ from insuring one’s possessions (not knowing whether something may happen to them), where paying the premium is similar to performing the ‘good’ deeds. By contrast, if one is able to know whether a reward or punishment will ensue, the major premise of the objection is cancelled.

The objection that one acts from an insight into what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ can still be proposed. One acts in accordance with the Ten Commandments, e.g., because one acknowledges their value. I can’t prove that those who have an intuition of this sort are wrong. It is, however, doubtful whether their position is tenable. Is there such a thing as an intrinsic good quality? The Bible isn’t helpful here. In the statement that “The Lord is good, a strong hold in the day of trouble […].” (Nahum 1:7), is ‘a strong hold in the day of trouble’ the reason why He is good? If so, the positive effects of His actions are simply posited and ‘good’ should be understood as ‘agreeable’ or ‘useful’. If not, no reason for His goodness is given.

Leaving the Bible aside, it is difficult in general, having analyzed the elements involved in actions, to find ‘goodness’, especially if one considers accounts such as Mackie’s argument from queerness, indicating that it is hard to see how moral qualities would fit with the things with which one is acquainted.[43] It is, then, up to those who appeal to intuitions, to inquire whether these really pertain to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ elements or whether they may be reduced to other elements than these.

Conclusion

In this article, I have attempted to ascertain whether moral elements may be present in religion, having focused on the Christian faith. A number of results were reached which may be perceived by some as radical. It was my intention to inquire as critically as possible, not eschewing any conclusion a priori. Still, the outcome doesn’t necessarily lead to far-reaching practical changes. In particular, no reasons not to adhere to Christianity (or any other religion) were brought to the fore. By contrast, I have concentrated on the specific motivation to do so. This culminated in two perspectives.

If one is to act on account of an acknowledgment of the (inherent) goodness or wickedness of some things, it is important to find out whether such qualities may be said to exist at all. The reason frequently given in the Bible (a reward or punishment which is to follow) merely points to a selfish perspective and discounts an alternative explanation.

The same analysis can be applied to the situation in which God’s power is the central issue. Selfishness may be advanced in general as the basic drive to act. A meta-ethical inquiry also poses some difficult questions (not only to religions, but to a number of philosophies as well) which can’t be ignored. This is not necessarily detrimental to the position of religions; it does mean that some of the doctrines pertaining to reasons for adhering to them may be up for critical revision. Still, it will mean that the followers of religions will be able to maintain them in a world in which their tenets are ever more critically questioned.

Literature

P. Abelard, Ethics (Scito Te Ipsum). Translated by D. Luscombe. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971

Anselm, De Conceptu Virginali et De Originali Peccato. Complete works, vol. 2. Rome: F. S. Schmitt, 1940

Th. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Complete Works, vol. 7. Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1892

Augustine, De Natura Boni. Œuvres de Saint Augustin, vol. 1. Edited by B. Roland-Gosselin. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1949

Augustine, De Trinitate, part 2. Œuvres de Saint Augustin, vol. 16. Edited by P. Agaësse. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1955

G. Biel, Collectorium circa Quattuor Libros Sententiarum, Book 3. Tübingen: J. Mohr, 1979

Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae. Munich/Leipzig: K.G. Saur, 2000

Bonaventura, Breviloquium. Complete Works, vol. 5. Florence: Ad Claras Aquas, 1891

R. Bultmann, Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979

P. Damiani, De Divina Omnipotentia. Edited by A. Cantin. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1972

R. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (Meditationes de Prima Philosophia). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 2. Translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1990

Th. Hobbes, De Cive (the English version). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983

Th. Hobbes, Leviathan. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984

S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (Frygt og Bæven). Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 6. Translated by H. Hong and E. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983

G. Leibniz, Discours de Metaphysique. Complete Writings and Letters: Philosophical Writings, vol. 4, part B. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999

J. Mackie, Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth et al.: Penguin, 1978

J. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982

Plato, Euthyphro. Complete Works, vol. 1. Translated by M. Croiset. Paris: Les belles lettres, 1959

B. Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Complete Works, vol. 3. Edited by C. Gebhardt. Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1925

References

Both men taught the gospel of Christ to a small group of followers and sought to apply the teachings to the practical economic realities of their day.  Each was aware of social and economic injustices, and the Christian mandate to love and respect one another equally.

The Prophet Joseph’s economic ideas are institutionalized today as the extensive, international welfare program sponsored by the church he founded.  In contrast, the ideas of Don Jose Maria, (whose surname is frequently shortened to Arizmendi), underlie the Mondragon cooperative business group which, though its values are derived from Catholic social thought (Herrera, 2004), has no formal affiliation with the Catholic Church.

Joseph Smith Jr.

Joseph Smith Jr. was born in Sharon, Vermont, on 23 December 1805, more than a hundred years before Jose Maria Arizmendi’s birth in Spain.  He was the fifth of eleven children of Joseph Sr. and Lucy Mack Smith.  Like Don Jose Maria, Joseph was deeply influenced by Christian thought as contained in the Bible.  For Joseph, it began in his home where his parents stressed personal religion, more than regular churchgoing, and encouraged each of their children to seek salvation through Jesus Christ.  The Smiths participated daily in family prayers, the singing of hymns, and scripture reading.1. In The Papers of Joseph Smith, ed. Dean C. Jessee (1989), 1:3; spelling and capitalization modernized.

Smith was only 24 years old when he founded what is now The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints on 6 April 1830 in Fayette, New York, and became its first president.  He had little formal schooling and no management experience that would have prepared him to organize and preside over both a new church and emerging communities of religious converts.  He was constantly in search of principle-based pragmatic solutions to problems encountered day by day.  He sought answers through prayer and reported receiving frequent revelations. 

Based on the law of consecration he received as a revelation soon after starting the new church (D&C 42:31-36), Smith established the economic system called the United Order in Kirtland, Ohio, and in Far West, Missouri, in the early 1830s.  In this system members deeded their properties to church representatives; then received all or part of those properties back as individually-owned stewardships.  At the end of a year, each person holding a stewardship was expected to donate any surplus material goods he had gained by working with his deeded properties back to the church.  Money, property, and materials goods were then distributed to others according to their needs under the direction of a few designated church bishops.  It was not easy for even the most devout members to adjust to this unusual economic system and there were many challenges in administering it.

New York attorney James Lucas and Brigham Young University business school professor Warner Woodworth identified some similarities between the Mondragon cooperatives inspired by Arizmendi and Joseph Smith’s law of consecration in their 1996 book Working toward Zion: Principles of the United Order for the Modern World.  In a chapter about Mondragon, they argued that the use of surplus capital to promote the common good was a central characteristic of Smith’s concept of consecration in a Zion society.  “In a Zion economy, all the economy’s savings and investment capital are to be consecrated to the united order’s temporal and spiritual purposes” (p. 328).  Interestingly, one of those purposes was to create places of learning in every city of Zion (Bushman, 2005, pp. 220-221).  Likewise, in Mondragon, a percentage of profits earned by the cooperatives is reserved for use in the community, with both youth and adult education being among the primary concerns.

In the 1840s, when Joseph Smith developed another new city, this time in Illinois, he did not implement the United Order.  Instead, he initiated in Nauvoo the Bible-based practices of fasting, contributing fast offerings, and providing service to help the poor.  However, many members of the LDS Church continue to view cities of Zion--in which there exists a combination of mutual prosperity, loving concern for the well-being of others, voluntary economic equality, and the dedication of one’s time and energy to spiritual pursuits—as the ideal type of community.  There is an expectation, grounded in 19^th century LDS scripture, that such cities will be established again before the Second Coming of the Savior.

In the decades that followed the martyrdom of Joseph Smith, Brigham Young established numerous cooperative businesses in the new Utah Territory, based partly on economic principles taught by Smith, combined with a strong dose of his own frontier entrepreneurialism.  The cooperatives included a wholesale department store named Zion’s Co-operative Mercantile Institution (ZCMI); an iron production enterprise; the Bank of Deseret, later to become Zions Savings Bank and Trust Company; and textile factories.  An in-depth discussion of these cooperatives is outside the scope of this paper.  An excellent source for information about them, however, is historian Leonard Arrington’s book Great Basin Kingdom: An Economic History of the Latter-day Saints 1830-1900 (2004). 

Though called cooperatives, these businesses were not characterized by either worker ownership or democratic governance, as at Mondragon.  Instead, according to Arrington, “Most Mormon ‘cooperatives’ were nothing more than joint-stock corporations, organized under the sponsorship of the church, with a broad basis of public ownership and support” (p. 293).  They were designed in part to minimize trade with non-Mormons and the resulting loss of financial resources to east coast investors.

During the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States, the practices of fasting, contributing fast offerings, and providing service to help the poor were formalized as the welfare program of the LDS Church.  This welfare program, as it functions in the 21^st century, is described later in this paper.       2. William Smith, William Smith on Mormonism (1883), 6.

3. Lucy Smith, History of the Prophet Joseph Smith, rev. George A. Smith and Elias Smith, (1902), 45.

4. Mark L. McConkie, The Father of the Prophet: Stories and Insights from the Life of Joseph Smith, Sr (1993), 11.

Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta

Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta was born on 22 April 1915 in the Basque village of Markina, the oldest son of a respected farm family of modest means.  At the age of three, he lost vision in his left eye following an accident.  Though entitled to inherit the family farm, he decided instead to enter the priesthood.  He studied theology and sociology at a seminary in Vitoria.  Though unable to serve in the military during the Spanish Civil War of 1936 because of his vision loss, he was nevertheless captured and held as a prisoner of war for a month before being released (Whyte & Whyte, 1991).

In 1941 he was assigned to serve under the direction of more senior parish priests in the small industrial town of Mondragon, about 50 kilometers from his place of birth.  Mondragon had been devastated by the effects of an economic depression and the Civil War.

Don Jose Maria held religion classes for the town’s young workers.  He also founded a soccer league.  In 1943, he established a technical school, the Escuela Politecnica Profesional, with an initial class of twenty students.   Later, he arranged for the school’s graduates to pursue college-level engineering degrees as extension students.  Five of the young graduates got jobs at the town’s largest manufacturing plant. 

Impressed by Arizmendi’s ideas of social justice and democracy in the workplace, the five men left their employer in 1956 to establish their own small manufacturing business as a cooperative.  It was called ULGOR, and was the forerunner of today’s diversified FAGOR, a major cooperative group within the MCC.

Arizmendi lived modestly, riding his familiar bicycle on the streets of Mondragon throughout his adult life.  He was not considered to be an outstanding orator.  Instead, his genius and commitment to social justice emerged in the course of quiet dialogues with the laborers of his parish.  Also, he carefully studied relevant Basque and Spanish laws in order to steer the development of the sometimes controversial cooperatives within the parameters of legality and governmental tolerance (Whyte & Whyte, 1991).

In poor health, Arizmendi died on 29 November 1976 at the age of 61.  He is revered in Mondragon and the surrounding Basque country.  Also, he is respected by a small cadre of social philosophers, economists, and businessmen, living in countries around the world, who are intrigued by the implementation of his ideas, and the demonstrable progress made toward social and economic justice through his unique variety of cooperative capitalism.

Ideological Comparison

For this comparison, Joseph Smith’s ideas will be taken primarily from scriptural works he published--the Doctrine and Covenants and the Book of Mormon.  The source for ideas of Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta is the English translation of thoughts excerpted from his writings by Jose Azurmendi, published by the Otalora as Reflections (2000).  For a more complete discussion of the relationship between Arizmendi’s ideas and the four basic principles of Catholic social thought—social justice, economic justice, the dignity of persons and their work, and solidarity—see David Herrera’s excellent article “Mondragon: A For-Profit Organization That Embodies Catholic Social Thought” (2004).

Eternal nature of man

Joseph Smith believed that men and women have an eternal existence that extends from a pre-earth life, through mortality on the earth, and onward through a never-ending, progressive and fulfilling existence beyond the grave.  Smith taught that God has a body of flesh and bones comparable to that of a man (D&C 130:1-3), existing in combination with an exalted spirit that is incomprehensibly advanced in terms of wisdom, compassion, and power.  By living righteously and repenting of all sins, men and women have the potential to become gods themselves in the post-mortal existence.  In this role, an exalted person would then devote all of his or her time, energies, and insights in assisting others to obtain the same.  An inevitable corollary to this concept is the recognition of a profound dignity in each human life.

Arizmendi also spoke of the eternal and progressive nature of men, though with fewer specifics. “There is something in the depths of the human spirit that is firm and eternal.  And there is also something that needs to be moving toward a new and superior expansion in consonance with the interior and social regeneration of human beings” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 35).

For Arizmendi, recognition of the everlasting nature of man underlies the desire to engage in the most noble of activities—helping one another. “Human beings fulfill the role of monarchs of creation in the measure that they subdue their own achievements to that which exists in them which is everlasting.  To be fulfilled means to ask for help and help others” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 124).

Greatest value is in development of individuals rather than in material success

Smith understood the development of people--in terms of character, wisdom, learning, and goodness—to be far more significant than material success.  He taught that the overarching work and glory of God is “to bring to pass the immortality and eternal life of man” (Moses 1:39).

Arizmendi gave a similar priority to human development: “It is definitely the human person who is the author, center, and end of all economic and social life” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 24).  “If we have learned anything in life [it] is that the primary factor in everything is the human being, as well as his or her quality and spirit” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 26).

People do not “aspire to economic development as an end, but as a means” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 29), according to Don Jose Maria.  “Progress is not acquiring more, but being more, acting better, giving more of oneself” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 71).

Equality, Unity, Solidarity

Arizmendi persistently encouraged his parishioners to think of themselves as equals.  “We should begin by considering all humans as citizens of equal dignity and destiny” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 123), he said.  “A person who has dignity must feel shame of being and living as the wealthy in a world of two billion undernourished human beings” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 138).

He recognized that financial disparity separates people from one another. “The idea of ‘having more’ bewitches us and greatly devalues our life when this idea polarizes us around ‘having more’ and the corresponding signs of prestige” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 71).  Arizmendi encouraged the workers to maintain “solidarity” with one another, in part so that they could overcome opposition from outside the cooperatives.  This meant that they would minimize their salary ratios, and also act in unity to accomplish good things for the group. 

A revelation received by Joseph Smith in 1831 in Kirtland, Ohio, is attributed to Jesus Christ.  It also contains a clear injunction against the evil of economic disparity: “But it is not given that one man should possess that which is above another, wherefore the world lieth in sin” (D&C 49:20).

Smith did not consider wealth itself to be evil.  In Book of Mormon narratives, righteousness generally brought prosperity to both individuals and communities, thus establishing a correlation between the two conditions in the minds of readers.  The evil was the social distance that might develop between rich people and their poorer neighbors, potentially interfering with the unity of hearts and minds needed to do God’s work (Bushman, 2005, p. 155).  In one revelation, it was stated this way: “For if ye are not equal in earthly things ye cannot be equal in obtaining heavenly things” (D&C 78:6). 

The ideal society, also known as a Zion society, was understood to be one like that which existed among the Disciples of Christ following his death.  “And all that believed were together, and had all things common; and sold their possessions and goods, and parted them to all men, as every man had need.  And they, continuing daily with one accord in the temple, and breaking bread from house to house, did eat their meat with gladness and singleness of heart” (Acts 2:44-46).

Fasting

Joseph Smith believed in the biblical practice of fasting, or abstaining from food for a period of time, as described in the book of Isaiah in the Old Testament (Isaiah 58:6-8).   Combined with prayer, it was a method for improving spirituality.  Fasting and prayer could bring insight into eternal truths, as expressed by Alma in the Book of Mormon: “Behold, I have fasted and prayed many days that I might know these things of myself.  And now I do know of myself that they are true; for the Lord God hath made them manifest unto me….” (Alma 5:46). 

Smith also understood fasting and prayer to be a means of bringing God’s power to bear on problems: “The children of God were commanded that they should gather themselves together oft, and join in fasting and mighty prayer in behalf of the welfare of the souls of those who knew not God” (Alma 6:6).  Also, the self-denial of fasting served an additional purpose when combined with the practice of contributing a fast offering to be used to help the less fortunate.     

Arizmendi appreciated the self-mastery achieved through fasting as a means of heightening one’s freedom: “The suppression of necessities by means of self-conquest, sacrifice and fasting is the way to true freedom” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 51).  Setting an example of self-mastery, he lived modestly throughout his life, rather than use more material goods than he needed for himself.

Property and possessions

Joseph Smith considered material possessions to be gifts from God.  Acting as temporary stewards over whatever property and possessions they owned legally, men and women were responsible to use what they had to benefit all of God’s children.  The concept of stewardships was put into practice during the United Order days described briefly above.  In the current church welfare program, members are invited to voluntarily contribute a fast offering to help the poor, whether or not they have enough money to comfortably make the donation.

Arizmendi also thought it was important for material goods to belong to individuals rather than to the state.  But whoever owned the material goods had a moral responsibility to recognize that many people were involved in the production of those goods, and should benefit from their use. “Having property or material goods does not give the right to abuse them.  In the end none of us can feel we are the creators of these goods to the point of being able to claim an absolute right to their ultimate use.  Many people have taken part in the existence and promotion of these goods, and thus the consideration of and effect on the common good must prevail in their use and practical applications” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 136).

Arizmendi linked the ownership of property with freedom: “The right to private property is good in that it maintains the freedom of its owner, but it is not good if this limits or deprives others of their freedom.  Therefore, we must do what best fits our personal identity with that which is ours, but considering what we do within the community in which we live, because by not taking this into account we could act in ways that are detrimental to others” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 135).

Freedom, choice, democratic governance

The ideal economic societies envisioned by Smith and Arizmendiarrieta were, strictly speaking, neither socialistic nor capitalistic. The societies they envisioned, like an ideal form of socialism, valued the contribution of laborers and sought the common good.  But, importantly, participation was always voluntary, based on the freedom of individuals to act according to their own consciences.  The freedom of individuals to choose their own actions and to function in a free market economy was more closely aligned with a capitalist viewpoint. 

Smith used the word “agency” to describe man’s right to make choices.  He warned against one man trying to dominate others and take away their agency.  While "it is the nature and disposition of almost all men . . . to exercise unrighteous dominion," according to a revelation recorded by Smith, it is best to lead "by persuasion, by long-suffering, by gentleness and meekness, and by love unfeigned” (D&C 121: 39-41). Interestingly, a similar restraint on the power of one person over another is manifest in the practice of democratic governance at the Mondragon cooperatives.

Joseph Smith considered man’s right to exercise his agency in making choices to be a fundamental principle in God’s plan of salvation.  Men and women choose whether or not to obey God’s commandments.  According to the prophet, those who obey are given more responsibilities and also experience more joy in this life and the life beyond the grave than those who do not choose to be obedient.

Joseph Smith believed more in theocracy than in democracy.  The principles of democratic governance enacted through the Constitution of the United States were a highly-desirable alternative to the rule of monarchs or dictators, as a manifestation of the fundamental equality of all men and women.  Yet he believed that ultimate authority resides with God, rather than arising from a majority of the people.  Ordinary men have authority only as it has been conferred upon them by God.

Though he also believed in God, Arizmendi attributed a great deal of moral authority to democratic processes. “Dialogue and cooperation, freedom and commitment constitute effective methods in the conjunction of wills and efforts to organize and manage human work, and, consequently, to humanize the economy” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 51).  Finding the right balance between the needs of one man and another, or the needs of one group versus another, was best accomplished through democratic governance of the cooperatives or other institutions: “Democracy is helpful in finding the point of equilibrium” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 53).  This contrasts with practices instituted in the LDS Church in which an ordained bishop has the authority to make decisions about who in his congregation will receive assistance from fast offering funds. 

“The most widespread notion in the world of the Basques is their eagerness for freedom,” Arizmendi commented.  “Let us now nourish this notion with justice, and then, Work and Unity will bring with them progress for our people” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 129).

Work and personal responsibility

The books of scripture published by the prophet Joseph Smith make frequent reference to the word “work.”  The work of men is to provide for themselves and their families through physical and intellectual labor.  The infinitely more important work of God, in which men and women are invited to participate, is to save souls.

There is dignity in labor and those who labor deserve a fair return for their effort.  The instructions revealed to a contemporary of Joseph Smith are considered to be generally applicable: “Thrust in your sickle with all your soul…and you shall be laden with sheaves upon your back, for the laborer is worthy of his hire” (D&C 31:5).

Likewise, Arizmendi believed in work and the value of the unique contribution that could be made by each person.  “One cannot sit at someone else’s table indefinitely, without ever contributing anything.  Each person has a benefit from society and one must offer to serve and give to society in kind” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 61).

To be responsible for one’s own material well-being was liberating, according to Arizmendi. “Knowing if we can live with dignity is what it is all about.  Living with dignity means being able to take care of ourselves.  In this aspect, we cannot be satisfied with any paternalism” (Arizmendiarrieta, 2000, p. 24).

Below is a brief description of the 21^st-century programs that have emerged, based on the Christian economic principles taught by Joseph Smith Jr. and Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta.

LDS Church Welfare Program

The welfare program of the LDS Church is designed to incorporate the biblical teachings of Jesus Christ.  Specifically, the program is organized to assist its members in providing for the physical, spiritual, social, and emotional well-being of themselves and others.  The services are supported financially through the voluntary contributions, or fast offerings, of church members who fast one day each month and donate the value of the meals missed. 

When members and their families feel they are doing all they can to provide for themselves and still cannot meet their basic needs, they may turn to their bishops for temporary assistance. The bishop, as a local minister, is considered to be in the best position to determine the nature and quantity of the help required to meet the individual’s or family’s specific needs.  He is the only person in the congregation authorized to draw upon the fast offerings donated by other members.  The bishop may also call upon the male members comprising the priesthood quorums in his congregation, together with the women of the Relief Society, to provide training or other services that may be needed.

As of December 2004, the LDS Church had established a resource system to support the work of bishops that included 128 storehouses similar to grocery stores, 105 wet- and dry-pack canneries, 59 production projects such as farms and ranches, 48 Deseret Industries thrift stores, 259 employment centers around the world, and 65 LDS Family Services agencies offering counseling and adoption services (Rather, 2005, p. 102).

Because the purpose of the church’s welfare assistance is to help people to help themselves, recipients are given the opportunity to work to the extent of their ability for the assistance they receive. Other church members also volunteer their time to do much of the labor in the storehouses, canneries, and so forth.

The LDS Church also sponsors humanitarian relief and development projects around the world that benefit those not of their faith.  These projects include emergency relief assistance in times of disaster, wheelchair distributions, eye surgery training, neonatal resuscitation training, gardening initiatives, and clean water projects.

Albert Bowen, a former member of the Quorum of the Twelve, expressed the overall purpose of the welfare program to promote the spiritual and temporal well-being of individuals.  “The real long term objective of the Welfare Plan is the building of character in the members of the Church, givers and receivers, rescuing all that is finest down deep inside of them, and bringing to flower and fruitage the latent richness of the spirit, which after all is the mission and purpose and reason for being of this Church” (Bowen, 1946, p. 44).

Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa

The Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa (MCC) is described on the group’s website by Jesus Catania, chairman of the General Counsel, as “a business group made of 264 companies and entities organized in three sectorial groups: Financial, Industrial and Distribution, together with the Research and Training areas.”

            “Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa is the fruit of the sound vision of a young priest, Don José María Arizmendiarrieta, as well as the solidarity and efforts of all our worker-members. Together we have been able to transform a humble factory, which in 1956 manufactured oil stoves and paraffin heaters, into the leading industrial group in the Basque Country and 7th in the ranking in Spain, with sales of 11,859 million euros in its Industrial and Distribution activities, 11,036 million euros of administered assets in its Financial activity and a total workforce of 78,455 at the end of 2005.   

            “MCC’s mission combines the basic objectives of a business organization competing in international markets with the use of democratic methods in its organization, job creation, promotion of its workers in human and professional terms and commitment to the development of its social environment.” (Catania, 2006)

The Mondragon Cooperacion Cooperativa currently espouses four corporate values.  They represent a concise synthesis of the ten cooperative operating principles developed over five decades by the workers.  The values are cooperation, participation, social responsibility, and innovation.  Members identify themselves as cooperators because they play a leading role in the management and results produced by their companies.  They are responsible for the problems and the triumphs of the company, being personally and directly affected by both (MCC, 2005).

The second corporate value is participation.  Members participate in the management of the company by electing councils and voting individually on major decisions.  They invest capital and share in the profits of the enterprise (MCC, 2005).

The third value is social responsibility.  Cooperators manifest their solidarity by putting collective interests first.  “Work is not only a means of obtaining income.  It is a source for satisfying the needs of personal and collective development, meaning that personal aims are compatible with those of the company, and those of the company are compatible with its involvement in the community” (MCC, 2005).

Finally, MCC members value innovation.  In order to compete in today’s international business environment for the purpose of maintaining or increasing employment in the Basque country, MCC must continually develop new products and production methods.  Research is conducted by teams working inside most cooperatives as well as by separate research cooperatives such as the Ikerlan.

The four corporate values are realized through ten cooperative operating principles: open admission, democratic organization, sovereignty of labor, instrumental and subordinate nature of capital, participatory management, wage solidarity, inter-cooperation, social transformation, universality, and education (MCC, 2005).

The cooperatives are said to practice open admission because they have a non-discriminatory policy, allowing all men and women, who are capable of doing the types of jobs that MCC is able to create, an equal opportunity to become worker-members.  The cooperatives are organized democratically on a one-member, one-vote basis.

Since it is labor that provides the opportunity for individuals and society to improve, labor has a supreme position, described as sovereignty.  Capital is merely an instrument necessary in business, but subordinate to the purposes of human and community development accomplished through labor.

Cooperators manage themselves and participate in management of the businesses.  They practice payment solidarity, which includes maintenance of the small ratios between lowest and highest paid employees and reinvestment of profits to capitalize ventures possibly outside of one’s own cooperative but within the MCC group.  This inter-cooperation creates synergies derived from the combined size of the group and the potential for transferring worker-members from one cooperative to another to prevent job losses.

MCC’s operating principles ultimately create a social transformation in the communities where cooperators live.  The transformation occurs as a result of the high level of job security available to those who want to accept the conditions of participation, combined with health and retirement benefits.  Add to that the investments by the corporation in community development projects.

MCC cooperators feel a sense of solidarity with others around the world that are working for social democracy, peace, justice, and development.  They practice outreach to these communities, especially in developing countries, through various initiatives such as the development projects sponsored by the Mundukide Foundation.

Finally, members of the Mondragon cooperative group are determined to commit adequate human and financial resources to education, to insure that both youth and adults receive quality vocational training, as well as instruction in the principles and practices of cooperativism.

Summary and Conclusions

Joseph Smith emphasized the ideas of fasting,; contributing fast offerings to be distributed by church bishops to help the poor; consecrating all of one’s time and energy to building the kingdom of God; stewardships; and the desirability of acting with the unity of one heart and one mind.  He considered agency, or freedom of choice, to be among the most fundamental rights of man bestowed by God.  At the same time, he attributed absolute moral authority to the commands of God.  A person, therefore, exercises his or her agency primarily in the context of choosing whether or not to follow God’s commandments.

Arizmendiarrieta spoke of work, solidarity, sacrifice, social justice, cooperation, freedom, and self-governance.  He recognized an eternal quality and value in human beings in which his social philosophy was grounded. Smith went further in teaching that humans are the same species or type of being as God, with the potential to become like God in every sense of the word, through eternal progression in this life and a continuing life after death.  Either position strengthens the idea that the development of people is profoundly significant, while the accumulation of wealth or other material goods is only a means of achieving a loftier end.

The welfare program of the LDS Church is an institutional program administered within church congregations.  While it does incorporate many gospel principles taught by Joseph Smith, still, church members anticipate living in a more perfect economic society in the future in which people will act as if they had one heart and one mind, sharing all materials goods equitably, with no poor among them.

The Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa is an international business group.  They publicly recognize the foundational, visionary contribution of the young priest Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta.  At the MCC adult education center, the Otalora, there is a small museum dedicated to his life and teachings.  But most often, cooperative members don’t speak of their guiding principles as an expression of Catholicism.  Instead, they refer to them simply as cooperative values.

Both principle-based programs are viable and international in scope at the beginning of the 21^st century, after a 175-year process for the LDS Church; 50 years for the Mondragon cooperatives.   

References

Arizmendiarrieta, J. M.  Reflections (J. Azurmendi, Ed., C. Herrera, C. Herrera, D. Herrera, T. Lorenzo, & V. Lorenzo, Trans.) (2000).  Aretxabaleta, Spain: Otalora (Azatza).

Arrington, L. J.  (2004). Great basin kingdom: An economic history of the Latter-day Saints 1830-1900, New edition.  Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Bowen, A. E. (1946).  The church welfare plan: Gospel doctrine course of study.  Salt Lake City, UT: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.

Bushman, R. L. (2005).  Joseph Smith: Rough stone rolling.  New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Catania, J.  Message from the chairman.  Retrieved 5 July 2006 from the Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa Web site: http://www.mcc.es/ing/quienessomos/presidente.html#

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, The. (1982). Book of Mormon: Another Testament of Jesus Christ.  Joseph Smith, Jun. (Trans.).  Salt Lake City, UT: Author.

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, The. (1982). Doctrine and Covenants of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.  Salt Lake City, UT: Author.

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, The. (1979). Holy bible: King James version.  Salt Lake City, UT: Author.

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, The. (1982). Pearl of great price.  Salt Lake City, UT: Author.

Herrera, D. (Winter 2004). “Mondragon: A for-profit organization that embodies Catholic social thought.” Review of Business, The Peter J. Robin College of Business at St. John’s University, Vol. 25 (1). St. John’s University.

Lucas, J. W., & Woodworth, W. P. (1996). Working toward Zion: Principles of the united order for the modern world. Salt Lake City, UT: Aspen Books.

Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa. (2005). Presentation MCC 2005, PowerPoint presentation available at the MCC Corporate Centre, Mondragon, Spain.

Rather, S. C.  (2005).  Supporting the rescue of all that is finest: A management history of Welfare Services 1995-2004.  Unpublished.  Available at LDS Church History Library.

Whyte, W. F. & Whyte, K. K.  (1991). Making Mondragon: The growth and dynamics of the worker cooperative complex.  Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Setting Up the Apology

Introducing Hans Urs von Balthasar

Hans Urs von Balthasar is acknowledged as one of the greatest Roman Catholic theologians of the twentieth century.  His name is familiar to Catholic theologians, but not to their protestant counterparts.  Perhaps one reason for this Swiss theologian’s relative obscurity is the density and difficulty of his work.  As Mark McIntosh of Loyola University puts it: “Von Balthasar’s style is by turns allusive, poetic, combative, oracular, dense and always idiomatic.”[1]  In doing theology, Balthasar drew from immense resources.  The influential catholic theologian Cardinal Henri de Lubac once wrote, “This man is perhaps the most cultivated of his time…Classical antiquity, the great European literatures, the metaphysical tradition, the history of religions, the diverse exploratory adventures of contemporary man and, above all, the sacred sciences, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, patrology (all of it)—not to speak just now of the Bible—none of them that is not welcomed and made vital by this great mind.”[2]

Hans Urs von Balthasar draws from these vastly diverse resources when he does theology.  As a result, it is easy to lose one’s way in the corridors of Balthasar’s prodigious thought.  But even though his writing may often overwhelm, one cannot help but feel a sense of respect at the depth from which Balthasar writes.  While my intention in writing this essay is to articulate and defend Balthasar’s “apology of holiness,” which I will begin shortly, I confess a secondary intention as well: I believe that his work is tragically overlooked all-too-often and deserves more attention, especially among protestant thinkers.  When I say that my goal is to articulate and defend, I am not saying that I intend to decisively refute all the potential defeaters that are issued against his apology.  Instead, I hope to show that any would-be-defeaters do not decisively refute Balthasar’s apology.  Because the apology draws from his entire corpus—which is elusive and difficult to categorize—any attempt to dismiss it without reckoning his major themes and arguments is premature.  It is based upon intuitions that deserve further consideration.  Hans Urs von Balthasar’s apology of holiness is coherent and has explanatory power.  None of the objections that I have considered diminish the strength of his argument; while my treatment of objections is by no means exhaustive, I have included what I consider three significant challenges to Balthasar’s apology.

Before articulating the apology, I must first give a brief sketch of some of the major assumptions and themes of Balthasar’s work. Balthasar’s work offers a strong critique to modernist approaches to metaphysics and epistemology.  In this way, he bears a striking resemblance to many postmodern thinkers.  However, Balthasar doesn’t adopt the extreme skepticism of standard postmodernism.  Nor does he reject the idea of meta-narrative.

The culmination of Balthasar’s thought is expressed in his theological trilogy.  In his trilogy, Balthasar sets out to articulate Christian dogmatics in aesthetic, dramatic, and veridical terms, based upon the Platonic properties of being—the beautiful, the good, and the true.  “Balthasar insisted that there can be no reflection on the truth of Christian revelation (Part 3) until it is lived out in committed action (Part 2), which a Christian will never feel called to do without having first perceived revelation in all its inherent beauty (Part 1).”[3]  It is the fundamental property of beauty to elicit a response; and for Balthasar, revelation is primarily a disclosure of the beauty of the Lord.[4]  Beauty compels, and a Christianity without beauty has lost its ability to compel.  Therefore, Balthasar begins his work with his theological aesthetics. 

I believe this approach can be particularly powerful in our postmodern context.  While Balthasar may be more rightly considered pre-modern in his orientation rather than postmodern, he turns modernist assumptions upside down and presents a compelling vision for Christian theology.  Balthasar has much to offer for those who are seeking a profound ally in the contemporary reformulation and orientation of theology for our postmodern era.

Articulating Balthasar’s Apology of Holiness

Now I return to the primary goal of this essay: to articulate and defend Balthasar’s “apology of holiness.”  Balthasar argues that “…the ‘perfect’ Christian is also the perfect proof of Christianity: in the Christian’s existential transparency, Christianity becomes comprehensible both in itself and to the world and itself exhibits a spiritual transparency. The saint is the apology for the Christian religion.”[5]  And to flesh this idea out a bit more, Balthasar writes: “Instead of possessing a ‘proof,’ they ‘are’ a reflection of it in their lives. As they respond to the glory of God and reflect it, it shines forth not only for them but for others. For, according to the Spirit of revelation, the really holy person—in the sense of Leviticus 11:44f.: ‘For I am the Lord you God; consecrate yourselves, therefore, and be holy, for I am holy’—is the best ‘proof’ of the truth of revelation.”[6]  So, Balthasar argues that the non-believer aesthetically perceives the “glory of God” in the life of a holy person.  This serves as the best “proof” for the non-believer.  In order to understand what Balthasar is claiming, we need to walk through the process by which, according to Balthasar, the non-believer comes to faith. By walking through this process, I will show how his apology of holiness consists of two claims.

Balthasar argues that it is impossible to have any knowledge of God or verify the truth of revelation apart from actually living within a Christian faith-stance.[7]  The individual outside of this faith-stance (the non-believer) is unable to come to the Christian faith of his or her own accord.  In order to perceive revelation, “eyes are needed that are able to perceive the spiritual form.”[8]  Non-believers are unable to have knowledge of God. As we have seen Balthasar articulate earlier, the non-believer is struck by the reflection of the Glory of the Lord in the life of the holy person, and as the non-believer is attracted by the holiness of the Christian, s/he is drawn into living a similar life.  As this person engages in “Christian experience,” the reality of God begins to take shape.[9] In other words, a person must first participate in Christian experience before one can have knowledge of God.  And at this point, we understand the second sense of “proof” for Balthasar—that the holy life is self-validating. 

So, then, we have two proofs:

Proof One

A holy person is an apology for Christianity, because, through observing how a holy person lives, a non-believer can be attracted by the holiness of the Christian and drawn into living a similar life.  And at this point, they acquire the needed faith-stance to have knowledge of God.

Proof Two

It is through living a holy life that a person can convince him/herself that the Christian faith is correct, and that the God which is believed in is a real God. David Burrell, Professor of Philosophy and Theology at the University of Notre Dame agrees: “So one easily presumes that God must first be shown to exist before we can legitimately engage in those practices associated with belief in God. In fact, however, the situation is quite the reverse. It is those who participate in such practices who come to appreciate how intimately these practices are intertwined with a conviction of the reality of God.”[10]

This double-apology of holiness demonstrates Balthasar’s general methodology: we have beauty leading to goodness leading to truth.  This approach stands against the modernist approach.  Because of this contrary stance, it is to be assumed that there will be many challenges to this argument.

Objections and Challenges to the Apology

Whether or not Hans Urs von Balthasar’s apology of holiness is coherent and has explanatory power depends upon how it stands up to its challengers.  I consider the following issues to be present the biggest challenges to Balthasar’s position: the question of justification of belief, the subjectivity of attraction, and the challenge of religious diversity.  

The Justification of Belief

“However, it might be objected that, in the last resort, von Balthasar’s is a position which, irrespective of what he asserts, in effect denies that human rationality plays any significant role in the decision to adopt, and then to remain within, a faith-stance.  In short, the objector might ask, has he not presented us with a notion of ‘proof’ which is at odds with our conception of rationality?”[11]  Is Balthasar a fideist?

The Subjectivity of Attractiveness

How is one to put any stock in some sort of ambiguous religious attraction?  The non-believer is supposedly attracted by the life of the holy person. If Balthasar argues that this attraction must be followed by faith, and then, only after adopting a Christian faith-stance, one may have knowledge of God, isn’t one left without any means by which one may judge the attraction? How is one to understand this religious attraction? 

Pluralism

Victoria Harrison, lecturer in philosophy at the University of Colorado, levels what is perhaps the most powerful challenge against Balthasar’s apology: “For even though von Balthasar’s philosophical anthropology is specifically Christocentric, there is no reason, in principle, why his insights about human holiness (suitably abstracted from his Christian beliefs) could not be extended to other religions.  Indeed, it is difficult to see how the apologetic value of human holiness is not equally applicable to other religions, and hence how those sharing von Balthasar’s core intention can, on pain of inconsistency, avoid religious pluralism.”[12]  Pluralism is perhaps one the most difficult challenges against traditional orthodox faith in our day.  Can Balthasar’s apology stand up to this challenge?

Defending the Apology

The first challenge that I will address is that Balthasar’s approach isn’t justified.  In other words, his perspective is basic fideism.  This challenge is leveled directly at the second “proof” that I articulated, namely, that it is through living a holy life that a person can convince him/herself that the Christian faith is correct, and that the God which is believed in is a real God.  There is a great deal of commonality in Balthasar’s approach and that of Reformed Epistemology.  The work of Alvin Plantinga is widely respected, and by showing the compatibility of Balthasar’s and Plantinga’s respective approaches, a solid case for the coherence of Balthasar’s argument can be made.

Balthasar and the Reformed Epistemology of Plantinga

According to Plantinga, “The sensus divinitatis is a disposition to form theistic beliefs in various circumstances, in response to the sorts of conditions or stimuli that trigger the working of this sense of divinity.”[13] In other words, humans were created by God to have an accurate understanding of the things of God. Unfortunately, sin has damaged the sensus divinitatis.  As a result, the ability of an individual to have veridical knowledge of God has been terribly damaged or lost altogether.  Plantinga puts forth his Extended Aquinas/Calvin Model to show how this sensus divinitatis is restored for the Christian and furthermore argues how it meets the criteria for a warranted belief, and therefore can produce knowledge. In this model, God has “proposed and instituted a plan of salvation: the life, atoning suffering and death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the incarnate second person of the trinity. The result for us is the possibility of salvation from sin and renewed relationship with God.”[14]

Notice the similarity between Plantinga’s proposition and Balthasar’s: “If it is a matter of interpreting God’s supernatural revelation in history from the available signs, then the spirit searching for meaning requires a higher light of grace in order to synthesize the signs…The light of grace comes to the aid of this natural inability; it strengthens and deepens the power of sight. It does not provide new clues or compensate for the inadequacy of the ‘scientific’ arguments; rather, it bestows vision and makes the eye proportionate to what is being shown.”[15]  Balthasar bases this new sight on the incarnation and atoning work of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit.[16]  In both models, we have a restored vision.  Christians are able to have sensory perception of God because of the restorative and saving work of Christ.

Next, according to Plantinga, God arranged for the production of inspired writings that give a reliable account of this saving activity by God.  Also, God sent the Holy Spirit to work in human hearts and minds, restoring the sensus divinitatis.  Now the regenerate believer is able to have knowledge of Christian truth.[17]  But this work of the Holy Spirit that restores the sensus restores affection as well.  The regenerate person is now able to love God and her neighbor.[18] 

Balthasar’s conclusions are essentially the same: “But once it has been determined that the point in Christ Jesus which explains his life-form does not lie within the purely human sphere and structure, but that everything about him rings true only when one accept his own presupposition of being the Son of God: then the initiation of life into this supernatural form becomes, at the same time, an initiation…within the realm of God’s own reality, and hence it finally becomes the process by which this reality takes shapes in the believer.  However, the rightness of the form to which the believer surrenders and entrusts himself—is confirmed within this existence of self-surrender as being true and correct, and this gives the believer a new form of Christian certitude which can be called ‘Christian experience.’”[19]  In other words, the restored God-perception enables the Christian to become initiated into the realm of God’s reality, where s/he is able to have true knowledge of God.

Balthasar is no fideist.  He recognizes the place for reason.  For him, knowledge of the truth of God comes from perceiving what actually there.  However, we need to see through the eyes of faith.  Faith may be a requirement for seeing truth, but there is still truth to be found.[20]

In order for a belief to be to be considered knowledge, that belief must be “produced by cognitive faculties or processes that are working properly, in an appropriate epistemic environment…according to a design plan that is aimed at truth, and is furthermore successfully aimed at truth.”  [21] Plantinga’s Extended Aquinas/Calvin Model meets these criteria. Here is a summary, by Plantinga of his model and its rationality:

To recount the essential features of the model, the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit working in concord with God’s teaching in Scripture is a cognitive process or belief-producing mechanism that produces in us the beliefs constituting faith, as well as a host of other beliefs.  These beliefs, of course, will seem to the believer to be true: that is part of what it is for them to be beliefs.  They will have the internal features of belief, of seeming to be true; and they can have this to various degrees. Second, according to the model, these beliefs will be justified; they will also have at least two further kinds of virtues.  IN the first place, they are internally rational, in the sense that the believer’s response to the experience she has (given prior belief) is within the range permitted by rationality, that is, by proper function; there is nothing pathological there.  And in the second place, the beliefs in question will have warrant: they will be produced by cognitive processes functioning properly in an appropriate environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief. To be sure, the process in question is not like the ordinary belief-producing mechanisms we have just by virtue of creation; it will be by the special work of the Holy Spirit.[22]

As with Plantinga’s Extended Aquinas/Calvin Model, Balthasar’s epistemology of the self-validation of faith fits the criteria: it has the internal features of belief, it is internally rational, and it is produced by the proper functioning of cognitive processes (of course, via the work of the Holy Spirit).  I will not, at this time, go into the task of defending Reformed Epistemology.  Plantinga’s reputation is super-human for a reason; he is much better equipped than I am at defending his position.  My hope is that, by showing how Balthasar’s epistemology could indeed be understood as a pre-cursor to Reformed Epistemology, Balthasar’s epistemology, while perhaps less developed, would be firmly bolstered by the arguments of Plantinga.  So, then, the second proof (It is through living a holy life that a person can convince him/herself that the Christian faith is correct, and that the God which is believed in is a real God) is on a solid foundation. 

Defending Proof One of the Apology

If you recall, the first proof in Balthasar’s apology is that A holy person is an apology for Christianity, because, through observing how a holy person lives, a non-believer can be attracted by the holiness of the Christian and drawn into living a similar life.  And at this point, they acquire the needed faith-stance to have knowledge of God.   This naturally raises two issues: how does this attraction work (and how does one judge religious attraction) and what is to keep this “proof” from applying to other religions?  First, attraction will be considered.

Considering Attraction

The place of religious attraction is strongly connected to the internal work of the Holy Spirit, which was briefly discussed earlier.  The ability to see with the eyes of faith is something graced by God, and actualized by the inner working of the Holy Spirit.  Therefore, the idea of religious attraction is wholly consistent with Balthasar’s epistemology, and also Reformed Epistemology.  However, it is worth pursuing some sort of criteria by which we might judge the attraction. 

Any religion based upon incarnation must take incarnation seriously.  There is a tendency to view religious feeling and attraction as a sort of disembodies mysticism.  Balthasar would reject such mystical experiences as docetic.  David Burrell agrees; for him, one is attracted to God by seeing the followers of that God living in such a way that is recognizably liberating: “We should not expect to be able even to locate the divinity outside of religious practice, much less provide a way of establishing God’s reality independent of those practices which are designed to offer us access to God. If these practices and the communities they form, however, present a way which is recognizably liberating…then we will be attracted to the God they worship and led to inquire how such a divinity pervades the practices we have come to cherish.”[23]

The attractiveness of the Christian life form is inherent, according to Balthasar.[24] The attraction the individual feels is for Christ—who alone bridges the gap between silent transcendence and creation, thus making it possible for beings to be drawn into Being.  According to Balthasar, an exemplary Christian life makes somewhat concrete the mystery of the hypostatic union.[25]  This is because the authentic saint is “always the one who confuses himself the least with Christ and who, therefore, can most convincingly be transparent to Christ.” [26]Balthasar recognizes that people can and do have attractions and experiences that they mistakenly attribute to God.[27]  However, he considers the form of Christ to be the measure by which we can judge such attractions.  For example, the holy person whose lifestyle we are attracted to is only validly attractive if their lifestyle imitates Jesus.  Jesus is the definition of holiness.  In the life of saints, therefore, there is a pointing to of Jesus, and it is this pointing-to that attracts.

Regarding Pluralism

Pluralism is the most likely defeater for Balthasar’s position.  Not only is pluralism a thorn in the side of most Christian epistemologies, it is particularly the case for Balthasar, since his epistemology has no external logic or arguments.  In fact, the external aesthetic of holiness (that one comes into faith by being drawn into and following the example of a holy person) could actually serve to strengthen the pluralist position. After all, the seemingly universal supply of virtuous people would tend to indicate that there is nothing unique about Christianity.

Plantinga’s Defense

Plantinga disagrees. He looks at three potential pluralist defeaters and stares them down: the probabilistic defeater, the abstract charge of moral arbitrariness, and the concrete charge of moral arbitrariness.  I will look at Plantinga’s rejection of the pluralist argument, and later look at Balthasar’s approach.  In this case, Plantinga and Balthasar take different approaches, and together present a compelling defense against the pluralist attack.

The probabilistic defeater (posited J.L. Schellenberg) argues that since there are SO MANY religions out there, the odds that yours is right are pretty slim. Plantinga rightly rejects this argument: “If there is a source of warrant for Christian belief that is independent of any it acquires by way of probabilistic relations to other beliefs, then the fact (if it is a fact) that Christian belief isn’t particularly likely with respect to those others doesn’t show anything of much interest. It certainly doesn’t provide a defeater for Christian belief.”[28]

The abstract charge of moral arbitrariness defeater (posited by Wilfred Cantwell Smith) argues that since we hold our beliefs to be true, and others hold their beliefs to be true, for us to conclude that we are somehow privileged, while they are somehow ignorant, is arrogant.  Therefore, “if S knows that others don’t believe p (and, let’s add, knows that he can’t find arguments that will persuade them of p), then S should not believe p.”[29] Plantinga disarms this potential defeater by exposing this view to be self-reverentially inconsistent and arguing that this charge is implausible. To show this he uses the example of lying about one’s colleagues to advance one’s career: “if I try my level best to ascertain the truth here—and it still seems to me sleazy, despicable, wrong to lie about my colleagues to advance my career, could I really be doing something immoral in continuing to believe as before? I can’t see how.”[30] If an individual were to, likewise, examine his or her own religious beliefs in the light of pluralism, and still come out maintaining his or her beliefs, how could this be wrong? Therefore, Plantinga concludes, “I can’t see how the moral charge against exclusivism can be sustained, and if it can’t, this charge does not provide a defeater for Christian belief.”[31]

The concrete charge of moral arbitrariness is posited by Gary Gutting.  He argues that there is a moral problem with the believer who holds to his/her own views when others disagree with him/her but doesn’t have any valid argument for his/her own views.[32] Plantinga once again dismisses the potential defeater: “If something like the extended Aquinas/Calvin model…is in fact correct, then there is a significant difference between the epistemic situation of those who accept Christian belief and those who do not; the objector is therefore assuming, unjustifiable and without argument, that neither that model nor any other according to which there is a source of warranted Christian belief is in fact correct ant that there is no such source for Christian belief.  That assumption has nothing to be said for it; the arbitrariness charge therefore disintegrates.”[33]

Balthasar’s Offense

Plantinga’s arguments are compelling, providing a solid defense against the pluralist attack.  Balthasar, however, takes a more offensive (not in the sense of being rude) approach.  Together, the two approaches complement one another.  To take a more offensive tack, Christianity has a trump-card that no other religion has—the Incarnation.  Millard Erickson, evangelical elder-statesman, writes: “Pluralism seems clearly to be threatened, however, by the traditional doctrine of the incarnation. For as usually understood, that doctrine proclaims that God’s presence and activity in Jesus were radically different from his presence and activity in other human beings. Thus, the way to contact with God must be through faith in Jesus and conversion to Christianity.”[34] And Balthasar’s formulation of Christianity is radically incarnational—so perhaps his epistemology and apology will not only stand up under scrutiny, but present a challenge to other religious beliefs as well.  No doubt, there are many gems of insight in the work of Balthasar.  I will examine three.

The Uniqueness of Christ. Jesus distinguishes himself from all other religious founders by saying that he is the historical form of the eternal God…God in flesh.  Balthasar writes, “Christ…as a historical form, demands faith for himself: this is something which no religious founder or thinker or artist could ever or will ever do as long as he understands himself to be obedient to the eternal Light.”[35] Christ, unlike other religious leaders and founders, does not point to something beyond himself, he points to himself.  Raymond Gawronski, SJ, teacher of theology at Marquette University, comments upon this idea further: “This claim of Jesus, the ‘I am’ claims…is without analogy in all of the history of religion.”[36]  Jesus’ uniqueness doesn’t lend itself to pluralist thinking.  While his uniqueness doesn’t necessarily argue for Christianity directly, it does undermine the assumption of pluralism that all religions have a shared essence.  One is forced to either agree or disagree with Jesus. 

The Theology of the Word.  “No human being ever creates his own language.  He receives it as a gift, even though once received, the gift can be infinitely enriched through human creativity.  But if no human being as such is able to create the word which makes dialogue possible, how is language possible at all?...The human being can only presuppose the word, the bond of communication.  In Balthasar’s opinion, only a theological answer can resolve the question.  Language is possible because man participates in the divine Logos. Language is a gift of the gods.”[37]  To Balthasar, the only way that man can participate in the divine Logos is through the Incarnation. In the hypostatic union, humanity and divinity participated in each other’s nature, thus providing a way for humanity to participate in the communicative bond of the Triune God (Balthasar argues that the Incarnation reaches backwards in time, so the objection that language existed before Jesus isn’t a serious defeater to him).  Therefore, we have a logical claim for the exclusiveness of Christianity.