|
 | |||||||||
 |
||||||||||
c:\Websites\foutz237\quodlibet.net\cgi-bin\axs\ax.cgi - working okay - no logging command received - use ?debugme query string for more info.
The Physical Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes
© Scott David Foutz
Through prolific writing and treatment of various subjects the so-called Hobbsean "system" emerges as an impressively coherent philosophical worldview. This system grounds in Thomas Hobbes' (April 15, 1588- December 4, 1679) unique understanding of philosophy as comprised solely of physics, a ground from which then proceeds his more infamous theory of civic and religious authority. In the interim between ground and political theory abound writings on optics, geometry, mathematics, Aristotelianism, psychology, perception, and more. All of these together comprise a reality which for Hobbes necessarily results in a world both natural and social governed solely by mechanical principles.
Hobbes' emphasis of the dependence of knowledge upon mechanical principle, when logically extended, produces a worldview in which nothing incorporeal can be said to be truly known, only "believed", and that for generally less than adequate reasons. For this and similar reasons the appellation "Hobs the atheist" would thereafter haunt him following the publication of Leviathan (1651). Locke, while echoing much of Hobbes' mechanical and anti-Aristotelian theory, would later soften several of Hobbes' conclusions by attempting to incorporate an effective and meaningful idea of God into an otherwise empirical framework. In other words, Locke proposes an empirical system which is not exclusively materialist. Locke's attempt however ultimately failed at sufficiently grounding the role of God within an empirical epistemology, and related philosophical inquiry soon dropped any meaningful notion of God from its endeavor.
The interesting and important question then arises as to what extent Hobbes accurately pioneered philosophical empiricism. Would Hobbes agree with the current general practice of distinguishing between his mechanical worldview and his materialism? Or does Hobbes adequately demonstrate that the former necessarily implies the latter? Without doubt Hobbes would agree that the priority of physics in natural and mental affairs necessitates a materialist or corporeal system, and that any truly philosophical endeavor must exclude foundational references to incorporeals. This is precisely Hobbes' critique of Descartes' Meditations and portions of White's De Mundo.
A major strength in Hobbes' general philosophical system lies in his work on the physiological origin of perception and rationation. De Corpore, chapter 27 of Critique de Du Mundo, Tractatus Opticus, and other writings put forward Hobbes' motion theory in terms of the relations between perceiving subject and object perceived and between perception and imagination (memory). Though clearly not intended as full expositions of the processes behind these relations Hobbes comes respectably close to contemporary theories. Wavelike motion accounts for the subject's ability to perceive an object's accidents. The appearance of these accidents are only "apparitions" in the mind and cannot be said to inhere in either the object nor motion itself, but are determined solely through the structure of the sense organ. A more mysterious and complex motion accounts for the rise of higher reasoning and mannerisms from perception. (Locke will likewise resort to "motion" as the operant among object, perception, and idea.)
Hobbes' physiological epistemology is perhaps felt most strongly in two areas vital to religious discussion. First, Hobbes' physiological epistemology has serious implications for the notion of free will. Throughout Hobbes' entire physical philosophy "motion" is defined as local motion between two corporealities and thus is limited to the influence of the corporeal agent upon the corporeal "patient". This motion, transferred by the agent under a specific complex of circumstances, will inevitably give rise to a particular and similar effect among any number of patients as long as the latter are similarly situated. For example, granted similarly conducive circumstances and abilities, any human will inevitably perceive the redness of a nearby apple. The mechanical interaction between object and subject determines the effect. As noted above, Hobbes also employs motion to account for the interactions among perception, rationation and mannerisms, and with no lesser degree of determinism involved. Thus the mind consists simply of motions within the body adhering to mechanical principle of natural law.
Hobbes does not deny, however, that men possess free will but instead proposes a compatibilist view in which "liberty and necessity are consistent... in the actions which men do voluntarily" (Leviathan, ch. 21). By liberty he does not understand that "of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man, which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do" (Ibid.). Hobbes defines the will as having an appetite upon which one acts; to not act is simply to have an inclination. Thus the will cannot be said to possess the freedom to choose one thing over another, although the individual may be said to possess the freedom to pursue that which he is caused to will.
Secondly, physiological epistemology implies that all mental endeavor derives from corporeal objects and cannot possibly be said to contain innate or transcendent ideas. Thus Hobbes' philosophy as physics excludes by definition any field of knowledge resorting to incorporeals, first among which is theology. In this exclusion Hobbes differs from both Descartes, who deemed metaphysics the "first part of philosophy" and Bacon who acknowledged a Divine science or philosophy.
In political practice this enabled Hobbes to justify his denial of ecclesiastical authority over the civil sovereign, since whereas the policies of the latter (eventually) ground in natural law, the former's claim to authority remains dubious at best. This is the basic argument of Leviathan, with stress on the ecclesiastical abuses of both the papacy and independent (antinomian) protestant groups. In Hobbes' system the civil sovereign is such over all civil affairs and thus the ideal church is a State church answerable to its head, the civil sovereign. Thus Hobbes can vehemently attack ecclesiaistico-theological claims to authority while at the same time profess the doctrines of the Church of England (which under Elizabeth's High Commission subscribed to the decrees of the first four councils of the early church).
Hobbes also applied this exclusion of incorporealities to biblical interpretation and proposed a thoroughly physical understanding of Old and New Testament concepts. Time here allows only mention of some of his conclusions without fair treatment of his arguments. References to God's Spirit must be understood as manifestations of God himself in the form of works including wind, wisdom bestowed, an inclination of man toward godliness, etc. Inspiration of the Holy Spirit must likewise be understood in terms of manifestations such as dreams or visions of God's voice, an accumulation of gifts, or internal virtues. God's Word (Scripture) must be understood to refer to both words spoken by God and about God, that is, the Doctrine of Religion. Hobbes limits the former to a very few instances involving Moses and Christ. The means by which God communicated to these two "is not manifest" (Leviathan, ch. 36). All other true prophecy derives from the "supernatural imagination" of the prophet informed by either dream or vision (cf. Spinoza). Likewise, true miracles are limited to those done by Moses and Christ, with all other references involving simply an ignorance of causality (cf. Hume). Other concepts such as eternal life, salvation and the Kingdom of God are all to be understood as fulfilled upon the earth. Hobbes does believe that God will intervene in history at the end of time, but all restorations will be corporeal.
On the general question From where does the God's Word (Scripture) derive its authority Hobbes points out that its origin, commonly held to be God as author, cannot be truly known, only believed. And whereas some believe for this reason and others for that, a unified answer as to a basis for belief and hence origin of authority does not present itself. Thus the relevant question is By what authority is God's Word made law? In those areas where Scripture echoes laws of nature such as are apparent to men of reason, natural law, that is moral doctrine consonant with reason provides a basis of authority. This central source of authority is buttressed and protected by a second, the civil sovereign who is able to enforce a right adherence of God's Word by those who are ignorant or rebellious. (Leviathan, ch. 33)
Thus it was that Hobbes' system of physical philosophy presented the scientist/philosopher with a formidable and thought provoking complex of theories, while churchmen and certain politicians (such as Clarendon) saw Hobbes' work as heresy and thereby cause for prosecution. It is clear that Hobbes' treatment of religious issues stems primarily from a consistent adherence to his fundamental definition of philosophy as physics and the physiological epistemology which results. He provides a noteworthy example of the historically problematic nexus of science and religion.
| ISSN:1526- 6575 | © 1998 - 2005 Scott David Foutz and Quodlibet Journal | Terms and Use |