On the Relation of Knowledge and Presupposition:
A critique of William Wrede's historical method
© Scott David Foutz

One major ongoing discussion in the area of New Testament theology and history in general grapples with the relation of presupposition to knowledge. Even within the recent past of New Testament studies we can locate the widest possible variety of views on this subject. On one side of the spectrum we find scholars proposing a radically scientific methodology based on positivistic empiricism, and who have traditionally exclaimed their great disdain for any hint of a priori suppositions. Typic of this view is William Wrede and his call for a "purely historical" ¹ New Testament theology. On the other side we find relativists such as the historian Carl Becker who deny the possibility of such "objective" historical knowledge and view history as "an imaginative creation, a personal possession which each one of us... fashions out of his individual experience, adapts to his practical or emotional needs, and adorns as well as may be to suite his aesthetic tastes." ² Becker well represents those who view presuppositions as determinant of one's view of events, especially one's view of the past.

This essay will attempt to strike a coherent mediating theory which acknowledges both the possibility, even necessity of objective knowledge as well as the inevitable yet limited influence of presuppositions. Due to the limits of this essay, our movement will be from only one side of the spectrum, namely, the scientific historical, to our more central position, and will make reference to relativism only where necessary. Wrede's statements and methods will serve as the basic framework of the scientific model for purposes of our critique. Having highlighted difficulties in Wrede's approach, an alternative theory will then be proposed and explained.

From the outset Wrede admits that he presupposes New Testament Theology to be "strictly historical in character" ³ , though he quickly points out that this presupposition is both self-evident and based on logical thinking. By strict historicity, Wrede understands New Testament theology to be "like every other science" which "has its real goal simply in itself, and is totally indifferent to all dogma and systematic theology." ⁴ Here, dogma and theology are synonyms for reconstructions of the textual and conceptual material of the New Testament in accord with a priori assumptions of the latters' normative or doctrinal nature. Thus, the goal of a scientific New Testament theology is to "investigate the New Testament without presuppositions to find out the content of the biblical religion" ⁵ . The historical character of New Testament theology requires it to approach the New Testament, not as a source book of doctrines, but as a book of history which must be taken on its own terms without the theologian's expectation or anticipation of any particular outcome. He must "be guided by a purely disinterested concern for knowledge, which accepts every compelling result" ⁶ .

This disinterested concern of the New Testament theologian is not simply a refrain from finding what he hopes to find, but also entails the subordination of all previous interpretations to every compelling historical fact discovered. "He must be able to keep his own viewpoint, however precious, quite separate from the object of his research and hold it in suspense. Then he will indeed know only what really was." ⁷ One contemporary New Testament theologian describes his own method in more stark terms. "Our allegiance is to history -- to the historical data we collect and to their interpretation -- and not to particular religious interests, not to the Apostles' Creed or the Westminster Confession of Faith. Whether liberating or not, historical knowledge is the best check we have on the human capacity to deceive ourselves." ⁸ It is clear that this scholar's list of "particular religious interests" is not limited to the Apostles' Creed and the Westminster Confession, but would claim to include all such traditional interpretations of the biblical material which call for the pious response of the reader. One fundamental conviction shared by Wrede and his ideological heirs is that one cannot approach the task of New Testament theology with tremblings of piety but with the spirit of radical scientific inquiry.

It is true that the subjection of one's heart-felt convictions and traditions to a reality check is a necessary and brave undertaking. But before we cast off our presuppositional garments and frolic naked in the streets of scientific honesty, it would be advisable to first determine what "reality" we are using as the standard in our reality check. If reality is so easy to come by, we must wonder why Wrede and his followers are so suspicious of others' claim to it. And if it is not easily attained, we have the responsibility of investigating whether or not such gurus actually have in hand what they claim. Thus, we turn to a more subtle critique of Wrede in the hope of determining the sufficiency of his claim to the standard of reality.

If we unpack the passages quoted above, we find two basic assumptions operating prior to any scientific investigation, namely, (1) that reality untainted by dogmatic overtones is accessible through historical data, and (2) that this untainted reality is the optimal standard against which we must evaluate our understanding of the New Testament message. We will here only briefly examine the first of these two presuppositions.

Regarding the first assumption, that untainted reality is accessible through historical data, two alternative possibilities likewise present themselves. (a) If in fact untainted reality is not accessible through historical investigation, our initial reality check will need its own reality check. Or, (b) if access to such reality is possible, but becomes tainted through the historian's particular handling or interpretation of it, we will still be no better off if our sole hope for a standard lies in untainted reality. It would not be pessimistic to concede that either of these two alternatives are just as possible as the initial assumption, and given the fact that what we are ultimately seeking to determine is a standard against which to evaluate our beliefs and convictions, it behooves us to investigate these possibilities thoroughly.

Questions raised by possibility (a), that such reality is either accessible or unaccessible, will be answered (for good or ill) only through one's epistemological stance on the very possibility of objective ⁹ knowledge. Thus, in accordance with one's adoption of empiricism, relativism, foundationalism, common sense realism, idealism or some other theory of knowledge, answers will be given to such questions as whether or not such knowledge is widely available to all equally, accessible only through particular methodologies, or simply beyond human attainment; whether the layman's storehouse of everyday knowledge is comprised of mostly, some or hardly any objective knowledge or whether the majority of human observations, beliefs and assumptions are simply unreliable in their correspondence with reality. In regards to New Testament theology, answers to these questions will subsequently determine one's views on the reliability of biblical eyewitnesses and authors, the biblical writers' (and the contemporary reader's) ability to correctly understand a thing at face value, and the reliability of commonly held positions and beliefs, to name only a very select few. We see that these latter questions are being confidently answered by various groups including Wrede.

As mentioned above, Wrede is working out of an empirical model of knowledge which exalts the inquiry methodology of the natural sciences and disdains the role of presuppositions. Although proceeding in the confidence of being free from predetermined outcomes, it is clear that Wrede's empiricism has had a determinant impact on his view of the theological task. The optimistic application of a purely scientific model to New Testament theology inevitably necessitates the primary subordination of theology to the laws of science. ¹⁰ Although in many cases, this is a practice which is expected due to the historical nature of the biblical message, such subordination to empiricism required the historian to begin his inquiry by renouncing "all theological, supernatural, and anthropocentric explanations" ¹¹ of phenomena described in the New Testament. As seen above, this translates into a rejection of traditional interpretations and convictions in favor of the collection and interpretation of raw data. One result of this is the ultimate removal of such New Testament theology from service to the Christian church. New Testament theology belongs now to the academic arena. ¹²

But, as Adolf Schlatter rightly points out, the adoption of such a methodological stance immediately places the historian in conflict with his object of research, the New Testament. All of these things -- belief in the supernatural, moral and practical considerations, and more -- are historical realities preeminent in the content and formation of the New Testament. If the historian opts to reject the validity of such elements from the offset of his endeavour, how can he possibly hope to arrive at an accurate depiction of New Testament theology and history? Such a stance also places the historian in diametrical opposition to the message and worldview the New Testament seeks to inform its readers of. Schlatter writes, "Whereas scientific thought is not aimed beyond the intellect but seeks to construct ideas, the proclamation performed by the New Testament allows no separation of thought from the other functions that together with it constitute our existence." ¹³ The New Testament's insistence on an integration of knowledge and personal response should not simply be bracketed off by the historian as ancient peculiarity, but must be recognized as stemming from a fundamental rejection and judgment "as monstrous a consciousness of God that remains mere consciousness and establishes nothing other than intellectual activity." ¹⁴ Schlatter's point is that any honest treatment of the New Testament must be willing to approach its content open-mindedly and accurately. Anything less results in a New Testament theology or history which "would be radically perverting its material". ¹⁵

Schlatter's observation pinpoints one of the major weaknesses of Wrede's empirical stance, namely, that for all its insistence upon objectivity and honest observation, the methodology thus employed radically fails to arrive at an accurate depiction of New Testament theology and history. This is due to empiricism's inability to incorporate the personal element into its methodology. The beliefs and convictions of the researcher are to be nullified in order that the truth may emerge. Thus, such a New Testament theologian is methodologically unable to incorporate personal responses and value judgments into his research. Whether or not this methodological ideal is possible is another question. But what becomes apparent from this brief discussion is the absolute inability of an empirical model to serve as the standard against which we may evaluate our beliefs and traditions. It would inevitably and always be the case that empiricism must deny the validity of such beliefs, either absolutely or pending further inquiry. And this is demonstrated by Wrede and others in their adamant rejection of the possibility of accuracy in previous traditional interpretations which incorporate elements of interpretive beliefs and presuppositions. It must be finally added that adoption of this methodology does not arise out of careful analyses of the subject matter, but rather stems from certain presuppositions regarding the nature of reality and knowledge thereof.

This brings us to possibility (b), which involved the historian's own influence. Here we may leave open the possibility of objective knowledge, and turn our attention to the role of the historian's own presuppositions. It has been adequately shown above that despite claims by scientific historians to freedom from interfering presuppositions, it is clearly demonstrable that such suppositions do exist and in fact determine the scholar's ability to accept or reject particular conflicting theories. Although Wrede attributes his rejection of dogmatic or theological theories to his dedication to scientific truth, he in fact rejects these a priori . This brings us to the truth that proportionate to our understanding of an historian's (and our) own theoretical framework is our ability to distinguish the nature and degree of influence it has on the historical data .

Once we choose to step back from empircism's claim as standard bearer, we find that we are also free from its inherent disdain of presuppositions. We are now free to evaluate the role of presuppositions in relation to knowledge, leaving open the possibility of both negative and positive influences. If we again turn to Schlatter, we find that much of his own methodology hinges on his understanding of the relationship between observation and judgment . Observation entails the theologian's honest interaction with the object in an attempt to achieve what Schlatter terms "genuine seeing" ¹⁶ . Such genuine seeing is the initial historical task of the theologian, and "is not concerned with the interests that emerge from the course of our own life, but directs its attentions quite deliberately away from ourselves and our own contemporary interests, back to the past. Our own convictions, which determine our thought and will, are held at a distance. We keep them out of the investigation so that we can see the subject matter as it was. Its effect on us and the way in which it might tie in with our own thinking and willing is not at this point brought into the field of our observation." ¹⁷

Lest we think Schlatter and Wrede essentially agree on this point, we must consider certain qualifications proposed by Schlatter. First, perfect knowledge of our subject is unattainable due to its location in the past. Second, the question of truth is at best partially answered by this historical ask, for there still remains the aspect of "effective reality" ¹⁸ , what the truth of the past as to do with us today. Thirdly, Schlatter strongly emphasizes the inability of the historian to completely remove personal judgments from the observation process. He writes, "It is clear that without the honest attempt to lay aside all personal concerns and the opinions of one's school or party, and seriously to see , academic work degenerates into hypocrisy. But even this honest attempt cannot overcome the fact that an observer sees with his own eyes only what the certainties that internally determine him allow him to perceive." ¹⁹ This third qualification then raises the question of the relation between observation and these "certainties", that is, between the pursuit of accurate knowledge and the presence of one's presuppositions. One the one hand, we are told that success in the historical task, and subsequently the dogmatic task depends upon a genuine seeing of what was, while on the other we are told that observation is determined by presupposition.

Schlatter's keen insight into these matters brings us amazingly close to the contemporary discussion. In the history of science, Thomas Kuhn has pointed out essentially the same relation between observation, discovery and the "paradigm" ²⁰ within which the researcher finds himself. Although Kuhn would not deny the validity of scientific knowledge, his thesis has nonetheless been championed by relativists. Schlatter's statements of "certainties that internally determine" present the same potential for misunderstanding if we fail to distinguish the precise role of presuppositions. As a conclusion to this discussion, I present what I consider to be a coherent and meaningful theory of presupposition which supports both the language of genuine seeing and determinant certainties, while allowing us to avoid the undesirable pitfalls of relativism.

We must first distinguish between observation, judgment and presupposition. Schlatter's definition of the task of observation can readily be adopted. It is that engagement by the researcher of an object, without reference to personal views or expectation. We may also qualify this by stating that the researcher is not able to remove from his observation all hint of judgment and belief, if for no other reason that the presence of a functional memory. But this does not imply that the content of the observations themselves are in any way determined from the offset by the presence of judgments or presuppositions. We can allow for an actual correspondence between object and idea. ²¹

The relation of two or more observations (past or present) results in the necessity of an exercise of judgment . We commonly understand such judgments of relation as constituting a theory . Theories exist continually within the mind either consciously or otherwise, since interaction and multiplication of observations is a process we are continuously involved in throughout the duration of our life. Thus, a researcher approaching an object finds it as undetermined content, but then immediately determines for himself the relationship of that observation to the ever expanding network of previous observations. The question then arises how one chooses a theory: Is a purely an arbitrary affair? Or is the choice of a theory itself determined?

This brings us to the role of presuppositions or my term of choice, meta-view. It is clear that the total possible number of theories exceeds those implemented by the observer. Some he flatly rejects, some he puts on the back burner, and some he habitually implements. Thus a selection of theories has taken place according to some set of criteria. The grid through which a theory is run in order to ascertain its acceptability is that of the meta-view . Nicolas Wolterstorff understands this meta-view to be comprised of what he terms "Control-beliefs" ²² . Such control-beliefs do not simply stand above the observer determining what he or she may think or suppose; viz., they are not to be understood as controlling-beliefs . They are interactive with phenomena and may indeed be informed by observation, experience, and logic. They also may contain a priori beliefs and beliefs derived from special revelation. Together, these control-beliefs comprise a meta-view through which the individual interprets the world and its meaning.

The meta-view functions on three levels. On one level, it serves to inform the individual as to the very nature of meta-view itself. This is to say that the meta-view contains some basic beliefs about itself. Wolterstorff terms these as data-background beliefs . This is not to say that the meta-view determines itself, but rather that once particular data-background beliefs are adopted the individual is committed to only those meta-views which are compatible with those beliefs. It remains possible for the individual to exchange these data-background beliefs with others, thus allowing for a shift in meta-views. Data-background beliefs may be derived from the entire gambit of sources listed above, and once adopted serve to inform the individual as to how further beliefs are to be received. On a second level, the meta-view contains beliefs which inform the individual as to what patterns are consistent with the meta-view. For example, prior to making any judgment regarding a theory on the origin of my PC, I first require some basic beliefs about computers and production. Wolterstorff terms these data-beliefs , since much of their content is actually data which the individual has gathered along his way. Any acceptable PC-origination theory would then necessarily comport with these data-beliefs. On a third level, the meta-view operates through control-beliefs. These control-beliefs are beliefs as to what types of theories are consistent with the data-background and data beliefs in place. Control-beliefs may be viewed as practical implications of the basic meta-view. Thus a researcher with meta-view A may need to scrap theory Z, not due to a determination on the part of the meta-view, but due to the theory's lack of coherence or compellingness in relation to the meta-view complex. It is crucial to note here that at no level of the meta-view is interaction with and informing by the physical realm made impossible. In fact, many of the beliefs involved derive primarily from interaction with the world. Thus scholarship contributes to the meta-view, and one meta-view can learn from another meta-view. This stands in contrast with the claim of relativism, a claim which ultimately undermines all academic endeavour and knowledge.

This essay has briefly outlined the inadequacies of an empirically based approach to the New Testament such as that proposed by William Wrede. In response to Wrede, a coherent theory of presuppositions has been put forth which abandons neither scientific knowledge nor the positive role of presuppositions. The essay has left open two important questions for further research. First, given the validity of scientific knowledge in light of our theory of presuppositions, what elements of Wrede's methodology are ultimately useful in our reconsideration of the historical task? It may well be found that much of Wrede's essay may be incorporated into our New Testament theology. Secondly, we have not answered the necessary epistemological question. We have concluded the discussion of presuppositions prematurely content with the possibility of objective knowledge while at the same time assuming its role in presupposition formation. A complete epistemology remains necessary in order for this proposal to be complete.